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(Block 20) - to personnel policies and practices and matters
affecting working conditions." The end result is a collective
bargaining agreement between the agency and the labor organization.
Yet, as in the private sector, limits are placed upon the
scope of collective bargaining. The parties are prohibited from
bargaining over matters precluded by:
"...applicable laws and regulations
,
including policies set
forth in the Federal Personnel Manual; published agency
policies and regulations for which a compelling need exists
under criteria established by the Federal Labor Relations
Council and which are issued at the agency headquarters
level or at the level of a primary national subdivision; a
national or other controlling agreement at a higher level
in the agency; and this Order."
Once bargaining begins, the threshhold question regarding each
and every proposal submitted is whether or not the Order precludes
negotiation over the subject matter covered. The purpose of this
paper is to analyze the impact this limitation on the scope of
negotiations has on labor-management relations in the Federal
Service.
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Labor-management relations in the Federal Service are governed by
Executive Order 11,491. The Order implements policies governing
"officers and agencies of the Executive Branch of the Government in all
dealings with Federal employees and organizations representing such
employees." The essence of the Order is for representatives of an
agency J and representatives of a labor organization representing
5
employees of the agency to "meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to personnel policies and practices and matters
affecting working conditions." The end result is a collective bargain-
6
Lng agreement between the agency and the labor organization.
Yet, as in the private sector, limits are placed upon the scope
. .
7
)f collective bargaining. The parties are prohibited from bargain-
ing over matters precluded by:
"...applicable laws and regulations , including policies set
forth in the Federal Personnel Manual; published agency
policies and regulations for which a compelling need exists
under criteria established by the Federal Labor Relations
Council and which are issued at the agency headquarters
level or at the level of a primary national subdivision; a
national or other controlling agreement at a higher level
in the agency; and this Order." 8
)nce bargaining begins, the threshhold question regarding each and
ivery proposal submitted is whether or not the Order precludes nego-
tiation over the subject matter covered. The purpose of this paper
s to analyze the impact this limitation on the scope of negotiations
as on labor-management relations in the Federal Service.
I. THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING
The Order has provided two avenues by which a negotiability
ssue may be resolved. First, the Federal Labor Relations Council

is empowered to decide negotiability questions if so requested by
9
the parties to the negotiations . The Council is composed of the
Chairman, Civil Service Commission; the Secretary of Labor; the
Director, Office of Management and Budget; and "...such other
officials of the executive branch as the President may designate
from time to time." A labor organization may appeal to the
Council if it disagrees with an agency determination that (1) the
proposal violates statute, regulation of appropriate authority
outside the agency or the Order, or (2) the agency's regulation
precluding negotiation violates law, regulation of appropriate
authority outside the agency or the Order. Absent these circum-
stances, agency determination will control. If appeal is taken
to the Council, certain procedures must be followed to ensure
(1) the appeal is determined on the merits, and (2) the Council
12
considers all issues each party deems appropriate. An agency's
failure to comply with the Council's procedures is tantamount to
a finding by the Council the proposal is negotiable.
In the private sector, challenges to the negotiability of
particular subjects are made either by an employer making uni-
lateral changes or by his refusal to bargain. In both instances
,
he counters an unfair labor practice charge by arguing the subject
matter involved was not a mandatory subject of collective bargain-
13
ing. Section 19(a) (6) of Executive Order 11,491 makes it an
unfair labor practice for an agency to "refuse to consult, confer,
14
or negotiate with a labor organization as required by (the) Order."
The Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor -Management Relations
15
is tasked with deciding unfair labor practice complaints. The
Assistant Secretary's decision may be appealed to the Federal
2

Labor Relations Council by a party adversely affected. Thus
should an agency make unilateral changes concerning, or refuse
to bargain over, a subject a labor organization believes to
be negotiable (i.e., a mandatory subject of bargaining), he
may file an unfair labor practice complaint with the Assistant
Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations. Should the
agency argue the matter was beyond the scope of negotiations,
the Assistant Secretary will decide the negotiability issue,
with the adverse party able to appeal this determination to
17the Council.
The Federal Labor Relations Council has reported its deci-
18
sions in both areas. The first step in my analysis will be
a thorough study of these decisions. I believe this study will
prove valuable in two respects. First, as the Council uses
19these decisions as stare decisis , it will provide parties
to negotiations with ready (albeit not infallible) guidelines
within which the parties may deal with various proposals at
the threshhold. A savings in time, money and effort could be
realized should the appeal or Unfair Labor Practice process
20
not be necessary. Second, and of far greater importance,
this analysis may well enable weaknesses in the system to be
identified and, hopefully, corrected.
A. NEGOTIABILITY DETERMINATIONS BY THE
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS COUNCIL
I have broken the proscriptions of the Order into two
basic categories: (1) those matters precluded by statute




1 . MATTERS PRECLUDED BY STATUTE AND/OR REGULATION
This category is divided into (1) rights and benefits
covered by statute; (2) matters precluded by regulations of




a. RIGHTS AND BENEFITS COVERED BY STATUTE
Congress has seen fit to provide the majority of rights
and benefits for Federal employees. Legislation has been en-
22 23 24
acted regarding pay, retirement benefits, life insurance,
25 26





awards, performance ratings, and training. There has
been little disagreement between agencies and labor organizations
over whether or not a proposal deals with rights or benefits
provided by statute. If disagreements do occur, the Council
will merely cite applicable statutory language in rendering its
30
decision. A case in point is Adjutant General of New Mexico .
The Union submitted a proposal that employees would be paid time
and one-half for overtime. The applicable statute, 32 U.S.C.
709 (g) 2) provided:
"Notwithstanding. . .any other provision of law...
technicians (the employees involved in this dispute)
shall be granted an amount of compensatory time off
from their scheduled tour of duty equal to the amount
of any time spent by them in irregular or overtime
work, and shaJLl not be entitled to compensation for
such work.
"
Given the statutory language, it is difficult to see any merit
in the proposal and the Council, simply quoting the statutory
32language, reached that conclusion.

b. REGULATIONS OF OUTSIDE AGENCIES
Regulations governing Federal employees are issued pri-
manly by the Civil Service Commission. Before analyzing
cases in which regulations of the Civil Service Commission have
affected the scope of negotiations, two procedural aspects must
first be discussed. The first is the Council will only consider
the applicability of regulations advanced by the agency as
limiting the scope of bargaining. It thus behooves an agency
head to research thoroughly all applicable Civil Service Regula-
tions when considering each and every proposal to be discussed.
This makes for a rather cumbersome system since the range of
regulations that could be interpreted as limiting negotiations
is fairly comprehensive. The failure of an agency to undertake
this study, however, will result in no negotiability determina-
tion being made and thus the proposal effectively being declared
negotiable. The second procedural aspect to be considered is
the Council itself will not decide the negotiability question
but will refer the matter to the Civil Service Commission for
resolution. If the Commission determines the proposal contra-
venes Civil Service regulations, the Council will incorporate
the Commission's interpretation of its regulation as the Council's
. . 35
opinion.
The case law sheds very little light on what types of
proposals have been held non-negotiable by the Civil Service
36Commission. Chapter 335 of the Federal Personnel Manual
governs promotions and has been held to preclude negotiations
regarding proposals that, in effect, would force the agency to
select a certain employee:
5

"When a selecting official is considering a group
of best qualified candidates and narrows his choice
to two. . .he will select that candidate with the
greatest length of service in the Office of Regula-
tions and Rulings." 37
The Civil Service Commission held this proposal violated Chapter
335, Sub-chapter 2 of the Federal Personnel Manual in that it
38
violated management's right to "non-select" an employee.
" Proposal X : When positions are not filled under the
provisions of paragraph (a) above, the vacancy will
be announced and a selection list will be prepared.
The selection list will contain the names of the two
employees rated 'best qualified' for promotion,...
except for: Officer Corps candidates, the names of
the two 'best qualified' employees who have requested
reassignment, the names of all employees who have re-
quested voluntary demotion, and the names of those
outside candidates who are considered to be better
qualified than internal candidates rated 'best quali-
fied. ' All candidates who appear on the selection
list will be given simultaneous consideration by
selecting officials, who should attempt to pick the ,qbest qualified person on the list to fill the vacancy."
The Commission held this proposal violated Chapter 335 in that
the Manual provided should sufficient candidates for promotion
be "best qualified" then realignment eligibles would be
considered first, whereas the union proposal envisioned candidates
42
applying from the unit would have priority consideration.
In Charleston Naval Shipyard the Commission held a union
proposal giving the Union "...the right to review all standards
used in the formulation of Merit Promotion Procedures" violated
Chapter 337, Sub-chapter 3-3 of the Manual prohibiting such in-
formation from being made available to anone except "...persons




Proposals concerning wages and incentive awards have also
been held to violate the Federal Personnel Manual. The barbers

at Naval Air Station, Memphis, Tenn. , were paid by commission
and submitted the following proposal:
"Employees paid by commission on a percentage of
sales basis will be paid at least 85% or no less
than the percentage paid to pieceworker employees




"It is the opinion of the Commission that wages and
commissions of barbers employed by the Memphis Naval
Air Station NAF activity are properly fixed in accord-
ance with the wage fixing procedures authorized for . .
special schedule categories in FPM SUPPLEMENT 532-2."
The Union representing employees of the Tobacco Marketing Division
of the Agricultural Marketing Service (USDA) proposed:
"The number of incentive awards given to employees
of the Tobacco Division of the Agricultural Market-
ing Service shall not vary by more than 1% less
than those for employees of the other Department
divisions.
"
The Commission held this proposal violated FPM Chapter 451,
Sub-Chapter 1-2 (a) (1) - (3) in that such awards are to be based
45
"...only on merit." Finally, 'in IRS, Philadelphia District
,
the Union submitted a proposal that the agency was to provide
free parking places for employees who used their personal cars
on government business. The Council referred the proposal to
the General Services Administration who held that GSA regula-
tions (41 CFR 101.17-101.1 through 101.17-102.1) precluded
anyone except General Services Administration from obtaining
parking spaces, and then only for government vehicles. ^ 6
The Council will uphold the negotiability of a proposal
over an agency objection it violates applicable outside regula-
tion for two reasons. The first is if, in the opinion of the
Council, the agency misconstrues the proposal. A ruling to

this effect provides little guidance since, although it results
in the proposal being held negotiable, it means only the agency
A "7
failed to carry its burden. The second reason is if the Civil
Service Commission, on request from the Council, holds the pro-
posal does not violate Civil Service regulations or the Federal
4 8Personnel Manual. *° Cases in this category can be utilized as
stare decisis regarding subsequent proposals.
In National Border Patrol Council the union submitted inter
alia , the following proposal:
"When the Service does an effective job of select-
ing and training its employees , it should have a
pool of career employees with potential for career
advancement for all positions covered by this plan.
Therefore, the area of consideration will not be
expanded to seek candidates outside the Service
unless less than three eligible highly qualified
employees bid for the position."
The agency head determined the proposal violated Chapter 335 of
the Federal Personnel Manual. This determination was overruled
49by the Civil Service Commission.
t
In Aberdeen Proving Ground
,
a union proposal that employees assigned to jobs in a higher
classification in excess of 30 days be temporarily promoted was
held by the Civil Service Commission not to violate Civil Service
50Commssion regulations contrary to the agency determination. The
Council departed from its normal procedure in Social Security
Administration Headquarters, Baltimore . The union submitted a
proposal "that existing GS-13 positions (in the Unit) be filled
by employees with (Unit) experience at the GS-12 level." The
agency argued the proposal violated Chapter 335 of the Federal
Personnel Manual. The Council, without seeking an interpretation
51from the Civil Service Commission, held the proposal negotiable.
8

The Council gave no reason for its departure from its usual
practice and one can envision serious problems ensuing should
the Commission disagree with the Council. However, given the
similarity of this case to the Border Patrol case, I imagine
the Council felt it unnecessary to seek another opinion on the
same issue.
C. APPLICABLE AGENCY REGULATIONS
53Prior to the promulgation of Executive Order 11,838, agencies
were permitted to interpose their own regulations as a bar to
negotiations with the limitation that such regulations must be
"issued to achieve a desirable degree of uniformity and equality
in the administration of matters common to all employees of the
54
agency. . . " This caveat only prohibited subordinate activities
from interposing local regulations. Regulations with agency-wide
applicability were successfully interposed on numerous occasions.
However, Executive Order 11,8 38 established the "compelling need"
criteria.
"An agency and a labor organization that has been
accorded exclusive recognition, through appropriate
representatives shall meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to personnel policies
and practices and matters affecting working conditions,
so far as may be appropriate under applicable laws
and regulations, including policies set forth in the
Federal Personnel Manual; published agency policies
for which a compelling need exists under criteria
established by the Federal Labor Relations Council
and which are issued at the agency headquarters level ,- 5
of a primary national subdivision ....'1 (emphasis mine)
The Council has promulgated regulations defining "compelling need."
"A compelling need exists for an applicable agency
policy or regulation concerning personnel policies
and practices and matters affecting working conditions
when the policy or regulation meets one or more of
the following illustrative criteria:

(a) The policy or regulation is essential, as
distinguished from helpful or desirable, to the
accomplishment mission (sic) of the agency or the
primary national subdivision;
(b) The policy or regulation is essential, as
distinguished from helpful or desirable, to the
management of the agency or the primary national
subdivision;
(c) The policy or regulation is necessary to
insure the maintenance of basic merit principles;
(d) The policy or regulation implements a mandate
to the agency or primary national subdivision under
law or other outside authority, which implementation
is essentially nondiscretionary in nature; or
(e) The policy or regulation establishes uni-
formity for all or a substantial segment of the
employees of the agency or primary national sub-
division where this is essential to the effectua-
tion of the public interest. "
From a review of the cases in this area, an argument can
be made the Council is going to find a compelling need exists
(i.e., the proposal is non-negotiable) only if two factors are
present: (1) the regulation in question explicitly conforms to
statutory or Civil Service Commission mandate, and (2) the pro-
posal in question completely disregards that mandate.
To date, the Council has found a "compelling need" in only
one case. In Adjudant General, State of Kentucky , the union
proposed Reduction- in-Force (RIF) procedures that would have
established seniority as a primary factor. The applicable
National Guard Board regulations provided a technician's military
performance must be considered in any RIF determination. The
Council held:
"Hence, the NGB regulations implement in an essen-
tially non-discretionary manner the statutory
mandate that technicians maintain military member-
ship. . .whereas, in contrast, the union's proposal
would focus solely on the technician aspect of
technician employment. . .and thereby sanction tech-
nicians unqualified to hold the military grade for
technician positions being retained in those posi-
tions as a result of a RIF. Accordingly, since
10

the NGB regulation implements a statutory mandate
...which implementation is essentially non-discre-
tionary in nature, we find that a compelling need
exists for the regulation to bar negotiations...""
In Kansas National Guard , the union representing civilian
technicians submitted a proposal to the effect the members of
the unit no longer be required to wear the National Guard uniform.
The agency interposed the National Guard Board regulation requir-
ing the uniform to be worn. After deciding the National Guard
was a "primary national subdivision..." the Council went on to
58hold since the National Guard Technician Act of 19 68 does not
establish the uniform requirement, the regulation failed to meet
59the compelling need test. In Army Material Development and
Readiness Command , the Council held the Army regulation did not
conform to promotional criteria established by the Federal Person-
nel Manual. Finally, in GSA, Region 5 , the Council held a
union proposal requiring the agency to furnish office space to
the union was negotiable over the agency's objection it con-
flicted with internal agency regulations:
"Thus, there is no showing that these internal
regulations, intended solely to restrict the
assignment of office space within GSA, implement
the mandate of the statute. .. "^l
This would be an easy test to administer based on Council
decisions to date; but it certainly does not deal with sub-
6 2
sections (a), (b) , (c) and (e) of 5 C.F.R. 2513.2. It can
be surmised the Council is going to place a heavy burden on the
agency to show compelling need. It would appear the agency
would have more success alleging the proposal violated either
statute, outside regulation or the Order, certainly a viable
alternative in the cases discussed. Clearly, the proposal in
11

Adjudant General/ State of Kentucky is in violation of 32 U.S.C.
Sec. 709(b) and most likely contravenes the agency's right
to retain employees under Sec. 12(b)(2) of the Order. Like-
wise the agency could have argued in Army Material Development
and Readiness Command the proposal interfered with management
right to promote under Sec. 12(b)(2). In GSA Region 5 , the
argument would have been more complicated, but the agency could
have relied on GSA interagency regulations detailing the require-
6 6
ments necessary for securing office space vice its own "in-
ternal" regulation.
It would appear agencies are starting to abandon the in-
ternal regulation defense in favor of the above. A case in
point is Immigration and Naturalization Service . In this case,
the union proposed that the uniformed border patrolmen it
represented be allowed to wear a "union patch" on their uniforms
subsequent to the removal of the bi-centennial patch required for
*
1976. The agency did not rely on agency uniform regulations in
arguing non-negotiability; but rather argued the proposal violated
fi 7
Sec. 12(b) (5) of the Order on the ground the union patch would
lead the public to believe the patrolmen were representatives of
the union vice members of the Border Patrol. The Council sustained
the agency's position on the ground the proposal effectively negated
the agency's ".. .right. .. to determine the methods and means... by
6 8
which (agency) operations are to be carried out." There was no
mention in the opinion of the agency's uniform regulations which
69
clearly would have precluded the wearing of such a patch. It can
be argued the agency would have been successful with this argument
in Kansas National Guard .
12

2. RIGHTS RESERVED TO MANAGEMENT BY THE ORDER - §§H & 12 (b
a. WORKING CONDITIONS, ETCETERA. .
.
§§11 (a)
"An agency and a labor organization that has been
accorded exclusive recognition, through appropriate
representatives shall meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to personnel
policies and practices and matters affecting working
conditions..." ^0
"Representatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority
of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives
of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment." 71
Under the NLRA, the question of the scope of negotiations arises
when an employer makes a unilateral change "...in respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employ-
ment or refuses to bargain over a particular subject." The labor
organization responds by filing an Unfair Labor Practice charge
with the Regional Director. The employer will counter this charge
by alleging the unilateral actions he took, or the subjects in
question, were beyond the scope of bargaining.^2 since the "...
matters affecting working conditions..." language of the Order is
similar to the "conditions of employment..." language of the Act,
one would expect at least some litigation as to the extent this
language of the Order limits the scope of negotiations. Instead,
the Council has ruled Section 11(a) is applicable to the scope
of negotiations question in only four rather limited situations.
The most significant situation is proposals affecting persons
outside the unit. The Council has held an agency is not required
to bargain over proposals regarding who will provide cafeteria
services, '** the filling of threshhold supervisory positions out-
7 a 75
side the unit, /4 reserved parking spaces for patients; and
13

itate educational benefits available because of state National
7 6
Juard affiliation and not because of union membership. Second,
Jne Council has ruled Section 11(a) precludes bargaining over
iroposals whereby a union desires to place "representatives" on
management committees. In Customs Service, Region VII , the union
)roposed a union representative sit on a budget committee. The
inion representative would only present the union's viewpoint and
77
nake "non-binding" recommendations. In Data Processing Center
,
Austin, Texas , the union proposed: "The Union shall have the right
;o designate a representative to serve as a member on the Position
78lanagement Committee." ' In both cases, the Council held the pro-
)Osal non-negotiable:
"In our opinion, the proposal. . .is outside the agency's
obligation to bargain; it does not directly relate to
personnel policies and practices and matters affecting
working conditions within the meaning of Section 11(a)
of the Order." 79
The third situation in which the Council has applied Section
.1(a) to a negotiability question involves a proposal affecting
'grade levels" assigned to employees of the Internal Revenue Service.
Cach case that was processed by the office was assigned a degree
)f difficulty by the supervisor. The employees were then assigned
ihese cases with the degree of difficulty corresponding to the
jrade level of the employee. The union proposed that any employee
iho disagreed with the grade level assigned to a case may file a
jrievance. The Council held the proposal was outside the scope
jstablished by Section 11 (a) :
"We are of the opinion that a supervisor's assessment
of the level of complexity of a work assignment does
not fall within the meaning of the phrase 'personnel
policies and practices and matters affecting working
conditions' and hence does not fall within the obliga-
tion to bargain under Section 11(a) of the Order."
14

The final case in which Section 11(a) was applied to the
[uestion of the scope of negotiations was Bureau of Prisons In
Legotiating a nationwide agreement, the union requested a proposal
e included in the agreement dealing with matters to be negotiated
.t the local level, matters that may not necessarily be included
n the nationwide agreement. The agency argued this was beyond
he scope established by Section 11(a). The Council held:
"In more detail, if, in a comprehensive bargaining
unit as is involved in the present case, matters
which pertain only to one or more facilities within
the unit are proposed in negotiations at the level of
recognition, such a proposal would not fall outside the
obligation to bargain under Section 11 (a) .. .simply by
virtue of its less than unit-wide applicability." 81
b. PERMISSIVE BARGAINING
"However, the obligation to meet and confer does not
include matters with respect to the mission of an
agency, its budget; its organization; the number of
employees; and the numbers, types and grades of posi-
tions or employees assigned to an organizational unit,
work project, or tour of duty; the technology of per-
forming its work; or its internal security practices."
*
"Matters which are within the ambit of Section 11 (b)
,
although exempted from the obligation to negotiate,
may be negotiated if management chooses to negotiate.
In other words, while there is no requirement that
matters within the ambit of Section 11(b) be negotiated,
the Order does permit their negotiation so that an
agreement which results from the negotiation of such _
matters does not, thereby, fail to conform to the Order."
The agency must therefore interpose a Section 11(b) bar at the
avel the contract is being negotiated on or they will be foreclosed
rom asserting the bar. The agency cannot rely on Section 15 review
w the head of the agency to interpose a Section 11(b) bar once a
Deal representative has negotiated and reached agreement on the
O A







The majority of Section 11(b) cases decided by the Federal Labor
Relations Council involve proposals having to do with "staffing
patterns." The leading case is Griffiss Air Force Base . The
civilian firefighters submitted the following proposals:
"(1) Proposed Article, Civil Disturbances, Section 1:
Unit Employees will not be used to quell civil disturb-
ances in order to comply with Mutual Aid Agreement. Unit
Employees will be used to perform Rescue, Fire Control,
and Extinguishment of Fires only.
Section 2: Unit Employees and Fire Equipment will
remain in Quarters on Alert Status when demonstra-
tions are anticipated in area of Griffiss Air Force
Base, as Professional Firefighters.
(2) Proposed Article, Unrelated Duties, Section 1:
Employer agrees not to require Unit Personnel to
participate in unrelated duties, e.g., Barrier De-
tail and after-hour I & E Calls unless required due
to emergency conditions on Base."
The Council held the proposals non-negotiable.
"...the phrase 'staffing patterns' of the agency, as
used in the Report in explaining the clause in 11 (b)
'numbers, types, and grades of positions or employees
assigned to an organizational unit, work project or
tour of duty, ' embraces the content of the individual
structures and manpower complements for the various
organizational units (e.g., the number and types of
positions and employees assigned to the fire depart-
ment) these organizational allocations of positions
and people are integrally related to and dependent on
the duties that will be performed by the individual
positions involved. In other words, here, too, the
assignment of duties to the individual positions is
the critical first step by the agency in determining
the staffing patterns for that agency. "86
The Council went on to hold this proscription exists even though
the duties sought to be excluded might be "totally unrelated to
the ordinary duties which might be expected to be performed by
firefighters.
"
The next "staffing pattern" case decided was Louisville Naval
Ordnance Station . The agency interposed a Section 11 (b) objection
16

to a proposal that position descriptions only contain tasks normally
related to the position and "catch-all" phrases could no longer
be utilized.
"Article 18, Section 6
a. When the term, 'such other duties as may be assigned'
or its equivalent is used in a position description,
the term is mutually understood to mean 'tasks that are
normally related to the position and are of an incidental
nature.'" 88
The Council held:
"In summary, nothing in the Order renders the mere
definition and clarification of general terms in job
descriptions, as proposed by the union, outside the
agency's obligation to negotiations under Section 11(b)
of the Order. Therefore, the agency's determination
of non-negotiability must be rejected."
At this point, the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers attempted to expand Louisville by submitting a
proposal that the assignment of personnel be limited to duties
Dnly included in the position description.
" Section 7 . In the interests of maintaining morale in
a good employer- employee relationship, the employer
agrees that, to the fullest extent possible in maintain-
ing the efficiency of the Government operations, every
effort will be made to assign work within the scope of
the classification assigned as defined by appropriate
classification standards ... (Emphasis in body supplied.)"
rhe Council was not willing to take this step.
"In the present case, the union's proposal would...
limit the agency in the assignment of duties to unit
employees unless conditions prescribed in the agreement
exist—here, the conformity of the duties with the
scope of job-grading standards. Accordingly, we find
that the union's proposal is excepted from the agency's
g
,
obligation to bargain under Section 11(b) of the Order."




( 2 ) NUMBERS OF EMPLOYEES
Section 11(b) also has been held to bar negotiations on pro-
posals requiring a certain number of employees be assigned a
particular task.
"Overtime, night, Sunday and Holiday assignments within
a station, and within the employee's regularly assigned
duties, will be distributed equitably among those
employees qualified to perform the work. For this pur-
pose, 'equitable distribution' shall mean equal periods
(1/2 day equal 1 period) of overtime for all participat-
ing employees computed by the day. To assure implementa-
tion of this section at sea and airports, the Agency
agrees to the following rations: All Citizen Passengers
—
1 Inspector to 30 passengers; All Alien Passengers
—
1 inspector to 20 passengers."
The Council ruled: "Section 11(b) of the Order expressly provides
that the number of employees so assigned to a work project or
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tour of duty are outside the agency's obligation to bargain."
Included within this caveat would be a proposal simply requiring
the agency to distribute the work of the agency equitably among
95
all employees.
(3) TOURS OF DUTY
3
The Plum Island Animal Disease Laboratory is engaged in research
on exotic disease of animals. To provide for round-the-clock
operation and maintenance of its building and equipment, it ini-
tially employed four crews of 11 men each who worked on three
rotating, weekly shifts, supplementing the regular 8-hour, 5
days per week maintenance employees. The agency then decided its
work could be more effectively accomplished by eliminating the
third shift in one laboratory and establishing two new fixed
shifts, working on a regular five day basis. Concurrently, the




"Changes in personnel from one scheduled shift to
another or from one existing five day period to
another, are assignments or scheduling of personnel
and not changes in tours of duty. Should management
...determine that a change in scheduled tours of duty
is necessary. .. such determination will be presented to
the local representatives... (c) onsultations will be
undertaken to arrive at a mutually aceptable schedule.
If consultation does not result in a mutually acceptable
tour of duty .. .negotiations of a formal schedule will
be initiated; these negotiations shall be conducted
in good faith to assure no undue delay in establishing
an effective date for a revised schedule." ^°
n essence, the union desired any proposed change in the status
uo be subject to negotiation and no change be made by the
mployer until agreement was reached with the union. The Council
eld any change in "tours of duty" was a right reserved to manage-




Agencies have asserted proposals involving employee exchanges
f shift, overtime, and placement assignments are also exempted
rom the obligation to bargain urider Section 11(b) of the Order.
"Article 22, Sec tion 4 : An employee, upon request,
will be allowed to swap shift assignments and/or days
off if a qualified replacement, approved by the super-
visor, is available and willing to work and if the
work flow is not impaired.
Article 23, Section 3(A) : An employee will, upon re-
quest, be released from an overtime assignment if a
qualified replacement, approved by the supervisor, is
available and willing to work, and if the work flow is
not impaired.
Article 29, Section 3 : An employee will, upon request,
be allowed to swap placement assignments, if a qualified
replacement, approved by the supervisor, is available
and willing to work and the work flow is not impaired. " 9 °
n holding these proposals negotiable, the Council reasoned:
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"...we are of the opinion that, contrary to the agency's
contention, the subject proposals are not excepted from
the agency's bargaining obligation under Section 11(b)
of the Crder, since they do not concern the structure
of the shifts, the job constituency of the overtime
activities, or the nature or components of placement
assignments." ^9
The Customs Service case has been held to allow negotiations
>n a proposal allowing employees the right to request particular
;hifts, with preference being given to seniority in the event
:wo or more employees request the same shift.
The Council has held non-negotiable proposals allowing employees
.o rotate "details" ("temporary assignment of employee to a dif-
erent position for a specified period, with the employee returning
;o his regular duties at the end of the period."). -*-01
(5) FLEXITIME
Flexitime proposals:
"Each daily tour of duty will include a core period to
be worked by all employees from 9:00 a.m. to 2:30
p.m. The additional three hours to be worked within
the flexible time bands during the 6:00 a.m. to 5:30
p. m. time period."
ere held by the Council to be negotiable, albeit with limitations:
"As previously noted, the union concedes that the
proposal does not give the employee the right 'to
refuse to appear for work when ordered to do so."
Moreover, as expressly stated by the union, the pro-
posal is not intended to limit management's right "to
require that individual employees be assigned specific
tours of duty outside the flexible allowances when
such assignment is necessary to accomplishing the
mission. ' " 103
(6) TECHNOLOGY
Section 1Kb) allows an agency to limit the scope of bargain-
ng over technological changes.
"Article 18, Section L : Appropriate communication
equipment will be installed in all Immigration vehicles
in those places where Officers are required to work
in remote areas. The equipment will provide for prompt
contact with local law enforcement authorities.
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Article 18 , Section : For safety considerations,
appropriate communication equipment will be provided
for communications between all Agency vehicles and
their assigned offices. " 104
The agency head determined the proposals concerned the technology
of performing the agency's work and thus were excluded from the
bargaining obligation by Section 11(b) of the Order. The Council
upheld this determination: "...the proposals in the instant
case would require the agency to negotiate .. .with respect to
the installation or provision for use in its vehicles of commu-
nications equipment." 1^5
This decision is to be contrasted with Border Patrol , Yuma
,
Arizona . The union proposal in this case read:
"Drag roads will be maintained on a regular basis
and in such a manner so that they are reasonably
smooth and free of ruts, potholes, and washouts
and any other roughness or irregularity which may
be caused by usage, weather, or other contributing
cause or element." *
Over an agency contention this proposal involved "bargaining over
the technology of its work," the Council held the proposal was
"intended to reduce the chance of injury to the officer" and
would not restrict the agency from employing any technological
means whatsoever to accomplish that goal. '
(7) INTERNAL SECURITY
Section 11(b) also exempts "internal security practices"
from the scope of bargaining. Thus the following proposal:
" Section 4 . The employer agrees to make employees aware when
(the Employer) is observing an employee's work performance," was
held non-negotiable.
"It is clear that the phrase 'internal security prac-
tices' in Section 11(b) includes the actual system
or plan of internal security adopted by the agency
...Therefore, we find that ...spot checks, security
checks and similar unannounced observations of internal
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security policemen during the execution of internal
security practices as mandated by the internal security
system adopted by the activity and conducted solely
for the purpose of evaluating the adequacy and effec-
tiveness of such internal security system is essential
to the effective functioning of, and thus a necessary
part of, the internal security system itself.'
C. RETAINED AGENCY RIG HTS - (§§12 (b)
The majority of negotiability issues arise as a result of
Section 12(b) of the Order.
"...management officials of the agency retain the right,
in accordance with applicable laws and regulations —
(1) to direct employees of the agency;
(2) to hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain
employees;
(3) to relieve employees from duties because of lack
of work or for other legitimate reasons;
(4) to maintain the efficiency of the Government
operations entrusted to them;
(5) to determine the methods, means and personnel by
which such operations are to be carried out; and
(6) to take whatever actions may be necessary to
carry out the mission of the*agency in situations
of emergency." ^09
The Federal Labor Relations Council has maintained since the
advent of Executive Order 11,491 that any union proposal inter-
fering with the management rights delineated in Section 12(h)
would be non-negotiable. This proscription is mandatory; and
an agency head's determination under Section 15 that a particular
proposal contravenes Section 12(b) will prevail notwithstanding
the local bargaining representative having allowed its inclusion
in the agreement. The Council is the ultimate arbiter as to




(1) HIRE, PROMOTE, TRANSFER, ASSIGN AND RETAIN
§§12 (b) (2)
The majority of litigation involving Section 12(b) (2) con-
erns promotions. The Veteran's Administration Research Hospital,
hicago , case held negotiable a proposal under which the union
ould request that, after an initial promotion determination,
he "next highest level supervisor who has not participated in
he proposed selection. . . " would review the determination and
ecide who would be promoted. His decision would be final. The
ouncil held this proposal would not violate management's right
o promote, since it only related to who was deciding to promote
nd not who was going to be promoted. In addition, a labor
rganization may negotiate regarding the "areas of considera-
ion" — i.e., from which group of employees the promotee must
e selected.
"...The only area in dispute is whether existing
GS-13 positions will be filled by employees with
Bureau experience at the GS-12 level (Union's pro-
posal) or whether these GS-13 positions will be
open to Headquarters-wide' competition (management's
unilateral determination)."
"...we find that the union's proposal that existing
GS-13 positions in BHI be filled by employees with .
1 ?
Bureau experience at the GS-12 level is negotiable."
n the other hand, proposals that require an agency to promote
certain individual upon occurrence of a specific event have
een held to be non-negotiable.
" Section 4 . In the case of demotions taken volun-
tarily in lieu of separations of a reduction in
force action, the Employer will promote in inverse
order of their standing on the reduction in force
register at the time of the demotions the employee
so affected to the position from which he was de-
moted (or one exactly like it) when such a position
becomes vacant and is to be filled."
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We have previously noted that Section 12(b) (2) dic-
tates that management officials retain their existing
authority to promote employees. Moreover, since
the emphasis of 12(g) (2) is on the reservation of
management authority to decide and act on this matter,
no right accorded to a union may be permitted to
interfere with this authority." 114
The agency has absolute discretion under Section 12(b) (2)
o decide who it will hire to fill a vacancy.
"In the Council's view, the proposal presently before
us would require either (1) that management must fill
all vacant positions in accordance with the conditions
set forth in the proposa l ...As to (1), the pro-
posal categorically negates the decision and action
authority expressly reserved to management officials
authority expressly reserved to managmenet officials
under Section 12(b)(2) of the Order. ..as well as the
'implicit and co-extensive authority, under Section
12(b) (2) to decide not to take such action." H5
ollowing this line of cases, the Council went on to hold an
gency is not required to negotiate over a proposal to have
on-unit employees perform unit functions during weekends and
olidays on the grounds it would require the agency to hire
dditional personnel. H6
The only case decided regarding transfers was Immigration
nd Naturalization Service .
"5 - 3. A. 6. Return from Overseas Tour . Employees
selected for overseas positions under this or pre-
ceding plans shall be reassigned to the Continental
United States after the completion of an overseas
assignment that will not exceed three years." "'
he council held this proposal non-negotiable on the ground it
nterfered with management's right to transfer and assign person-
el.
"Consequently, the proposal imposes a limitation
on the timing of management's action. . .under Sec-
tion 12(b) (2). The authority reserved to management
under Section 12(b) (2) necessarily encompasses the
timing of the decision and action involved (in the
proposal) . " 118
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(2) EFFICIENCY OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS - SS12 (b)(4)
Agencies will challenge the negotiability of a proposal
that would require the expenditure of monies as violative of
Section 12(b)(4). The leading case is Naval Supply Center /
Charleston
,
S. C. The Union submitted a basic work-week pro-
posal: "The basic work v/eek will be 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m..,
Monday through Friday." ^-^The head of the agency held the
proposal non-negotiable since the activity was manned seven
days a week and the agency would thus be forced to pay overtime
to those employees who worked on Saturdays and Sundays. This,
the agency contended, impaired the efficiency of the Government
operations entrusted to them. The Council applied a balancing
test between potential increased costs and potential increased
benefits ("employee satisfaction, improved performance, contri-
bution of money-saving ideas, improved health and safety...").
The Council went on to say the agency bears the burden to sus-
tain a determination the proposal impairs the efficiency of
Government operations and a simple recitation that the proposal
may force the agency to expend monies will not carry this burden.
Therefore, the Council held the basic work-week proposal to be
4.- wi 120negotiable.
Another area in which the Council has been faced with de-
ciding the limits of Section 12(b) (4) concerns production goals.
The Patent Office Professionals Association submitted a proposal
substituting union formulae for agency formulae as applied to
production goals for the unit in question. The Council held:
"...the essence of the proposal is to ensure that
the production goals will be assigned in a manner
consistent with what is, in the union's view, a
statistically reliable calculation which indicates
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how much production can reasonably and equitably
be expected to achieve." 121
The Council held the proposal to be negotiable. While not
citing the "balancing test" language employed by Charleston
,
the quoted language in this case certainly indicates some type
of balancing test was being applied.
(3) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS - Sgl2 (b) (5)
The majority of negotiability cases decided by the Federal
Labor Relations Council concern union proposals designed to
protect work historically performed by unit employees. The
leading case is Tidewater . The union submitted two proposals:
" Art. IX, Section 1 : The employer agrees that
work regularly and historically assigned to and
performed by bargaining unit employees covered by
this agreement will not be assigned to military
personnel or to PWC employees excluded from the
bargaining unit.
Art. XXV, Section 1 : It is understood by the parties
hereto that decisions regarding contracting work
out of the unit and transfer of work within the PWC
are areas of discretion of the Employer. However,
it will be the policy of the' Employer that work
normally performed in the unit will not be con-
tracted out or assigned to employees not in the
bargaining unit unless such work is beyond the
capacity or capability of unit employees to perform
or if economic situations or technological changes ,
_?dictate that such work be performed outside the unit."
The Council held both proposals non-negotiable as violative of
Section 12(b) (5). In a long line of cases, the Council has up-
held this determination.
However, the Council has held negotiable proposals that
would not allow the agency to assign overtime to non-unit person-
nel except in extraordinary situations.
"The employer shall not assign normal scheduled
overtime to the employees who do not perform this




"Supervisors, Shop Planners, Planners and Esti-
mators or Employees not covered by this Agreement
shall not be assigned to perform the duties of
employees in the unit on overtime assignments
for the sole purpose of eliminating the need for
such employees on overtime." -*- 2 ^
It is difficult to ascertain how viable this apparent exception
to the work preservation prohibition is, however. In McClellan
Air Force Base
, the following proposal was held non-negotiable:
"Employees will not be systematically excluded
from receipt of overtime by management employing
other personnel for the purpose of denying over-
time to said employees."
Coast Guard, Miami , is distinguished as involving "...merely
a procedure for the assignment of work which management has
designated to be performed as scheduled overtime." The Council
distinguished Philadelphia Naval Shipyard as follows:
"Unlike the proposal in Philadelphia
, it is not
'solely concerned with the assignment of over-
time' and it clearly involves more than a mere
procedure for the assignment of employees to
overtime, as the union contends. In our opinion,
the literal language of the proposal ...' explicitly
would deny management the authority to assign bar-
gaining unit work to non-unit employees for the
purpose of reducing or eliminating the necessity
for overtime work. That is, the proposal before
us contains no qualification or clarification
of its express restriction on management's
'employing other personnel for the purpose of
denying overtime to (unit) employees.'" 12 "
The effect of these proposals is the same — to circum-
scribe management's ability to assign overtime to non-unit
employees. The distinctions the Council makes between Phila-
delphia Naval Shipyard and Coast Guard Miami on the one
hand and McClellan Air Force Base on the other seem rather
forced to me. However, since the Council has not overruled
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard
,
proposals utilizing that language
should still be negotiable. They will most likely accomplish
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the same purpose as a proposal modeled after McClellan Air
Force Base .
Another matter the Council dealt with under Section 12(b) (5)
was "on call." In Public Health Service Hospital , Seattle / the
union submitted a proposal that should the agency determine
employees were required to be "on call," each employee so assigned
would have the right to refuse such assignment. Additionally,
if the employee chose to accept the assignment, no restrictions
could be placed on his or her movements. Finally, the employer
"could not impose any restraint, interference, coercion, dis-
crimination or take any retributions against any employee who
refuses to serve in an 'on call' status or who, when assigned
'on call' should not be available when called." Over agency
objection that this proposal would, in effect, preclude the
agency from determining that "on call" was the appropriate means
for providing the hospital coverage deemed necessary, the Council
held the proposal negotiable. '
"However, on-call time, which is uncompensated time
spent by the employee away from the worksite pur-
suing activities predominantly in his own interest,
clearly cannot be regarded as part of the operations
of the agency .. .Hence, where, as here, a union proposal
to negotiate with respect to the use of on-call time,
Section 12(g) (5) may not be asserted as a bar to
negotiations . "127
(4) EMERGENCIES - §§12 (b) (6)
The final reserved management right the Council has dealt
with regards management's prerogatives during periods of emergency
"Union-employer business by a union representa-
tive, or an employee, performing work compensable





The agency argued this proposal would allow for overtime com-
pensation for labor relations duties in emergencies. Thus,
the agency went on, the collective bargaining agreement would
limit management's right to take "whatever actions may be neces-
sary" during periods of emergency, including precluding the per-
formance of labor relations duties. The Council, distinguishing
between "personal exigencies of individual employees" and "agency
emergencies in carrying out its mission," held the proposal did
i oft
not violate Section 12(b) (6) and was therefore negotiable.
B. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The only participation (as reported by Council decisions) , to
date, by the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management
Relations in scope of negotiating determinations involves uni-
lateral changes of agency regulations. It is apparent, if the
regulation affects personnel policies and practices and matters
affecting working conditions, the imposition of such a regulation
will violate Section 19 (a) (6)^ of the Order unless the subject
matter of the regulation has been removed from the scope of
bargaining by the Council or the Council can find a "compelling
need" for the regulation. 29
In Air Force Defense Language Institute , the agency uni-
laterally changed a regulation controlling overseas assignments
.
The union filed a Section 19(a)(6) unfair labor practice charge
with the Assistant Secretary arguing a refusal to bargain. The
agency argued the regulation in question properly limited the
scope of negotiations on the subject based upon criteria in effect
at that time. The Assistant Secretary upheld this determination
and the union appealed to the Council. The Council, applying
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the standards announced in Merchant Marine Academy , 3 held the
regulation in question did not conform to appropriate criteria
and thus was not a bar to negotiations.
In National Border Patrol Council , the agency proposed
changes in its personnel management regulations which were met
by counter proposals by the union. No agreement was reached and
the matter was submitted to the Federal Services Impasse Panel,
which dismissed the petition of the union because of the thresh-
hold questions concerning negotiability. The agency determined
its proposals were non-negotiable and affected the changes. The
union appealed the agency negotiability decision to the Council.
The Council held:
"Where negotiability issues arise in the context of
such unfair labor practice proceedings they are often
inextricably intertwined with disputed issues of fact
which must be resolved in order to arrive at a conclu-
sion concerning the motivation of the parties. Such
issues of fact are best resolved through the adversary
process of a formal hearing. . . The proper forum in
which to raise such issues is an unfair labor practice
proceeding before the Assistant Secretary." *--*2
The Council has yet to rule on a decision of the Assistant
Secretary involving a negotiability question. Thus, although
§§19 (a) (6) should shed some light on the scope of negotiations,
it would appear this approach has been neglected in favor of
the direct appeal to the Federal Labor Relations Council under
§§11 (c) of the Order.
C. MISCELLANEOUS BARS TO NEGOTIATION
The remaining issues decided by the Council pursuant to its
authority under Section 11(c) of the Order involve grievance pro-
cedures, official time, and dues withholding. An agency cannot,
either by regulation or by a determination of non-negotiability,
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foreclose the scope of negotiations as to what the grievance
procedure will be. " No proposal regarding the official time
employees are entitled to for periods spent in negotiations that
exceeds the limits set by Section 20 is negotiable. 34 However,
a proposal to allow employees to receive time for periods spent
IOC
in negotiations during mid-contract is negotiable. Finally,
an agency may not, by regulation, limit the requirements of
Section 21 involving dues withholding. ^°
D. SUMMARY
Section I provides a guide as to whether or not a particular
proposal will be held negotiable by the Federal Labor Relations
Council. The chart found in Appendix A is a synopsis of the
findings detailed in the section. If this were the stopping
point of the scope of negotiations in question, it would appear
a compilation of this sort would provide the answer to most nego-
tiability disputes. In addition, this compilation, when compared
to actual collective bargaining agreements, points out the true
nature of labor -management relations in the Federal service: once
the Council has determined a particular proposal is negotiable,
the odds are very much in favor of that particular proposal being
included in the collective bargaining agreement (or at least in
agreements entered into by any agency subsequent to the Nego-
1 37tiability decision) . It is my contention the system has thus
evolved into a search for the parameters of the scope of bargaining,
And, since the Order has been in effect for almost eight years,
the number of decisions rendered has pretty well established what
those parameters are. Therefore, through its limit on the scope
of negotiations, Executive Order 11,491 actually is promulgating
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the "Standard Collective Bargaining Agreement in the Federal
Service." Included in that agreement will be those articles de-




The ultimate arbiter of my thesis that a favorable negota-
bility determination by the Federal Labor Relations Council is
tantamount to including the disputed proposal in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement is the Federal Services Impasse Panel.
Should the parties be unable to reach agreement regarding a pro-
posal, the Panel is utilized to resolve the impasse. The Panel
139
consists of at least three members appointed by the President.
Upon request by either party, the Panel may recommend procedures
for resolution or it may settle the dispute by appropriate action.
Prior to requesting Panel consideration, the parties may seek
assistance from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
The Panel is empowered to dismiss the request, direct that
negotiations be resumed (with or without mediation assistance),
direct factfinding, authorize voluntary settlements, or take any
other action it deems appropriate. Included within the last option
is the power to impose settlement. Should one of the issues pre-
sented to the panel concern a negotiability question, even if so
determined by the Panel's own motion, the Panel will refer this
question to the Council before taking further action. Thus, if
the Council determines a proposal to be negotiable, the question
becomes whether the Panel will direct the proposal be included in




To date, the Federal Services Impasse Panel has actually
rdered specific proposals be included in a collective bargain-
ng agreement seven times. In five of these decisions, the Panel
as ordered the proposal propounded by the union be included in
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phe agreement. ' In one, Employment Standards Administration
,
>oth the union and the agency submitted proposals regarding the
:ontents of a Proposed Work Report Form. The proposals were al-
nost identical, except the agency proposal required the employee
[rilling out the Report to provide more data regarding action taken
on each case than the union proposal called for. The Panel ordered
the agency proposal be included in the agreement. The final
:ase, National Labor Relations Board , involved a union proposal
concerning office space for employees belonging to the unit. The
bargaining history was replete with offers and counter-offers,
with the union ultimately proposing:
"The agency is to take reasonable efforts to provide
private offices to professional employees if and
when additional office space is provided..."
The proposal went on to state the following factors would be con-
sidered in determining who would be entitled to individual offices:
(1) nature of work being performed by the employee, (2) length of
service and grade, (3) amount of present space, (4) space and
personnel needs of agency, (5) union-official status of employees,
and (6) agency past action and future plans concerning expansion.
The agency proposed:
"Employees are entitled to, and management shall
continue to take reasonable steps to provide, safe
and healthful working conditions , including reason-
able office space, and shall continue to give careful




The Panel ordered the agency proposal be included in the agree-
ment, concluding:
"The affected employees have adequate space within
the meaning of GSA guidelines , although there is a
shortage of space at the Employer's headquarters.
Moreover, although the employer made several offers
aimed at increasing the privacy of the current office
space, none were accepted by the union. Additionally,
the record does not show that office space conditions
for public sector employees — Federal or non-Federal
-- in comparable work situations are generally dif-
ferent." 146
The paucity of decisions makes it difficult to make any
judgments regarding the Panel's propensities in this situation.
Certainly a preponderance of the cases decided have been in
favor of union proposals. Of the two that weren't, one posed a
very insubstantial conflict, Employment Standard Administration .
The only guidelines that could be drawn are from National Labor
Relations Board , holding that past practices in the Federal
(public) service will be considered, all other considerations
being equal.
If my belief, that once the Council has determined a pro-
posal to be negotiable the agency simply submits to its inclu-
4
sion into the agreement, is valid, we will continue to see few
cases actually being decided by the Panel.
II. ARBITRATION AV7ARDS
"A negotiated agreement may provide for the arbi-
tration of grievances. Arbitration may be invoked
only by the agency or the exclusive representative.
Either party may file exceptions to the arbitrator's
award with the Council, under regulations prescribed
by the Council.." 147
By far the majority of collective bargaining agreements
entered into under Executive Order 11,491 include provisions for
148the arbitration of grievances. Unfortunately, arbitration, as
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It has evolved under the Order, also has a tremendous impact on
;he scope of negotiations. This is due to the fact the Ore :
illows the Federal Labor Relations Council to review and reverse
149lrbitration awards. The Council will reverse an arbitration
iward (1) if the arbitrator was biased, (2) if the findings of
fact were clearly erroneous, and/or (3) if the award violate s
1 50ipplicable law, appropriate regulation or the Order . It is the
:hird of these criteria that is of importance to the problem at
land.
It first must be understood that the concept of arbitration,
is it has evolved under the Order, is vastly different than labor
trbitration in the private sector. Although there certainly are
variations, in the private sector the arbitrator is confined to
Jne four corners of the agreement:
"The arbitrator shall have no right to amend,
modify, nullify, ignore, or add to the provisions
of the Agreement. He shall consider and decide
only the particular issue (s) presented... and
his decision and award shall be based soley upon
his interpretation of the meaning and application
of the terms of the Agreement to the facts of the
grievance presented." *--'l
The position taken by the Federal Labor Relations Council
iiat it will reverse "...if an award violates applicable lav;,
ippropriate regulation, or the Order," completely rejects the
>rivate sector approach. Instead, the arbitrator is forced to
iecide two questions: (1) Has the agency violated the agree-
lent? and (2) if so, does his decision and award comply not only
rith the collective bargaining agreement but also with applic-
ible lav/, appropriate regulation or the Order? In effect the
.rbitrator is forced to interpret statutes, regulations, and the
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Order. Unfortunately, the courts, the Civil Service Commission
(and various other agencies) and the Federal Labor Relations
Council are similarly tasked.
Based on this analysis, arbitration under the Order is
nothing more than fictitious third party resolution. The grievant
does not have his dispute arbitrated; at best, he is given a quasi-
neutral forum in which to present his grievance. The result ulti-
mately will be based on the decision of the ultimate interpreter
of the statute, regulation or section of the Order involved.
The decider may, or may not, attach some weight to the arbitrator's
decision. Of course, there may be situations in which the arbi-
trator can confine his decision and award to the four corners
of the collective bargaining agreement. However, these situations
will not involve any employee rights and benefits affecting that
most important of considerations — money.
A. BACK- PAY ACT
By far the preponderance of arbitration awards reviewed by
the Council involve awards of back-pay. All compensation of
this sort to Federal employees is governed by the Back-Pay Act:
"(a) For the purpose of this section, 'agency'
means —
(1) an Executive Agency;
(2) the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts;
(3) The Library of Congress;
(4) the Government Printing Office; and
(5) the government of the District of Columbia.
(b) An employee of an agency who, on the basis of an
administrative determination or a timely appeal, is
found by appropriate authority under applicable law
or regulation to have undergone an unjustified or
unwarranted personnel action that has resulted in
the withdrawal or reduction of all or a part of the
pay, allowances, or differentials of the employee —
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(1) is entitled, on correction of the personnel
action, to receive for the period for which the person-
nel action was in effect an amount equal to all or
any part of the pay, allowances, or differentials,
as applicable, that the employee normally would have
earned during that period if the personnel action had
not occurred, less any amounts earned by him through
other employment during that period; and
(2) for all purposes, is deemed to have per-
formed service for the agency during that period,
except that —
(A) annual leave restored under this para-
graph which is in excess of the maximum leave accumu-
lation permitted by law shall be credited to a separate
leave account for the employee and shall be available
for use by the employee within the time limits pre-
scribed by regulations of the Civil Service Commission,
and
(B) annual leave credited under subparagraph
(a) of this paragraph but unused and still available
to the employee under regulations prescribed by the
Commission shall be included in the lump-sum payment
under section 5551 or section 5552 (1) of this title
but may not be retained to the credit of the employee
under section 5552(2) of this title.
(C) The Civil Service Commission shall pre-
scribe regulations to carry out this section..."
And, pursuant to section b(2)-(C) of the Act, the Civil Service
Commission has delegated to agencies the power to decide if the
employee is entitled to Back Pay:
"When an appropriate authority (either the agency
head or an official so designated in accordance
with agency regulations) corrects an unjustified
or unwarranted personnel action, the agency shall
recompute for the period covered by the corrective
action the pay, allowances, differentials, and
leave account of the employee as if the unjustified
or unwarranted personnel action has not occurred and
the employee shall be deemed for all purposes to
have rendered service in the agency for the period
covered by the corrective action." (Emphasis mine) 153
The Act plays a central part in each and every decision the
Council has rendered concerning the viability of arbitration




This area has spawned by far the greatest amount of liti-
gation. The usual grievance arises when the agency promoted
from without the agreed area of consideration. The arbitrator
would av/ard retroactive promotion accompanied by back pay. The
agency would take exception to the award and, prior to October,
19 74, the Council uniformly held the awards were in violation of
154the Back Pay Act. However, in 19 74 the Comptroller-General
rendered decision B-180010. In this case, the General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board filled a clerical vacancy
in his office by selecting an applicant from outside the agency
and thereby rejecting four admittedly "well-qualified" applicants
who were already employed by the agency. The controlling pro-
vision of the collective bargaining agreement read as follows:
"ARTICLE IX: Clerical Promotions. Section 1 .
Introduction — the parties agree that the mission
and responsibilities of the Office of General Counsel
in the enforcement of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, demand a high degree of staff effec-
tiveness. It is therefore the policy of the General
Counsel:
a. To obtain and retain the best personnel avail-
able and to utilize as fully as possible all valuable
and appropriate experience.
b. To fill vacancies by promotion or re-assign-
ment of persons already employed in the Agency, pro-
vided their personal qualifications, training and
experience are equal to those of applicants from
other sources.
c. That recruitment from outside the Agency is
usually resorted to only to fill positions at the
entrance level or to fill positions for which eli-
gibles are in short supply or to appoint individuals
who will add to the personnel resources of the Agency."
The rejected applicants filed a grievance and the arbitrator
found the agency should have selected one of the four agency
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applicants. He thus directed the agency to re-run the selec-
tion, considering only the grievants and, upon selection, the
selectee be made whole for any loss of wages sustained. The
General Counsel selected one of the agency applicants and re-
quested, pursuant to 31 U. S. Code Sec. 71, the Comptroller-
General render a decision as to the appropriateness of a back-
pay award. The Comptroller-General held back-pay was warranted
in this situation. The Council acceeded to the Comptroller-
General's interpretation, although it did hold in order for the
award to be sustained the arbitrator must find "but for" the
violation of the agreement by the agency the grievant would have
157been promoted.
However, the decision by the Council in the Marshall Space
Flight Center case casts some doubt on the continued viability
of this analysis. Here the grievant, who had been demoted with-
out cause rather than suffer discharge due to a reduction in
force, was entitled under the collective bargaining agreement
to special consideration for promotion. However, the agency
chose not to fill the position from repromotion eligibles , and
eventually selected someone other than the grievant. The applic-
able provisions of the agreement were
:
"Section 28. 06... an employee demoted in NASA with-
out personal cause is entitled to special considera-
tion for repromotion to any vacancy for which he
is qualified and in the area of consideration at
his former grade (or any intervening grade) before
any attempt is made to fill the position by other
means.
Section 28.07. Employees eligible for repromotion
will be given special consideration for promotion
vacancies prior to announcement of such vacancies
under the Merit Promotion Plan.
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Section 23.02. The Employer agrees to implement the
promotion plan in accordance with all applicable exist-
ing or future rules or regulations and directives issued
by the Civil Service Commission and the Agency." x -, °
The arbitrator determined "...the failure to promote the grievant
to the vacancy. . .was arbitrary and capricious. (He) directed the
grievant be offered promotion to the position. .
.
(and) he be retro-
actively compensated." The agency appealed this award to the
Council , which sought interpretation from the Civil Service Com-
mision. The Commission held that although Federal Personnel Manual
Chapter 335, Sub-chapter 2, Requirement 1 "...strongly encourages"
the re-promotion of special consideration candidates
, it does not
"mandate that such re-promotion occur." The Commission went on
to state;
"...management must retain the freedom to decide,
without interference , which candidate it will select
from among those referred for a given position under
established procedures, or in fact, to make no selec-
tion at all. Whether or not the arbitrators inter-
pretation of the agreement and the merit promotion
plan was correct, the parties could not have appro-
priately agreed to subject management's reasons for
selecting one candidate over another to review by a
third party because it would contravene management's
right to make final selection for promotions."
(emphasis mine)
While this case only remotely involves "areas of considera-
tion," the language "...the parties could not have appropriately
agreed to subject management's right to select one candidate over
another..." certainly would apply to the situation detailed in
the NLRB case. In addition, even if the Civil Service Commission
were to reconsider, the language "...contravene management's right
to make final selections for promotions..." would apply with equal




On the other hand, were the agency to have acceeded to the
arbitrator's decision, the Comptroller-General most likely would
have agreed to a back pay award:
"Since this case was withdrawn from the Federal Labor
Relations Council in order to submit the question of
back pay to this Officer, it does not appear that the
Council ruled on the question of whether or not the pro-
motion provision in the agreement, or the arbitrator's
award thereunder, violated the retained right of the
agency to promote employees. However, while that ques-
tion is essentially one for the Council, we note that
the agreement and the award would appear to be proper
since the provision of the agreement is in consonance
with subchapter 3 - 3a of Chapter 335 of the Federal
Personnel Manual which provides that it is within the
discretion of the agency to limit its consideration of
applicants for positions to employees within the organi-
zation and the agreement only instructed the agency to
do that." 160
How the Comptroller-General would rule subsequent to Marshall
Space Flight Center is questionable. It appears the Council is
taking the position that all such awards violate Section 12 (b (2)
of the Order, dispensing with Comptroller-General decisions and
Civil Service Commission interpretations. In Community Services
Administration, Region V , the arbitrator found the agency had
violated the collective bargaining agreement in refusing to fill
a vacant GS-12 position. Instead, the agency had deleted this
position and created a new GS-7/9 position. In reversing the
award to promote the grievant to the GS-12 position with back
pay, the Council held this violated the agency's right not to
hire under Section 12 (b) (2) ,161The Council made a similar deter-
mination in Army and Air Force Exhange Service, Dallas . Here the
arbitrator found the grievant' s "lack of career progression...
was due to her position as a union officer..." in conflict with
the agreement. "The agency will immediately offer (the grievant)
a work assignment in Arlington, Texas, as a Procurement Assistant
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at the highest grade 8 step." (This was a promotion for this
grievant.) The Council held this award violated Section 12(b)(2).
The only case subsequent to Marshall which upheld an arbitrato:
award involved a situation in which the grievant had already been
promoted prior to the arbitrator's decision.
Should the agency choose to dispute an arbitrator's award
of promotion with back pay, it most likely will succeed if it
argues the award violates Section 12(b)(2). If it chooses to
acceed to the award , B18 0010 may still apply or the Comptroller-
General may adopt the interpretation of the Civil Service Com-
mission in Marshall Space Flight Center . A third alternative
would be to continue to allow promotion and back pay in "area of
consideraion" cases while denying it in "special consideration,"
"reorganization," and "union discrimination" cases — in effect
adopting an ad hoc approach. The first alternative provides
consistency but not relief; the second is wholly dependent on
agency discretion; and the third is totally devoid of consistency.
None of the alternatives provide meaningful relief to employees
denied promotion in violation of a collective bargaining agreement
within traditional labor arbiration guidelines.
2. OVERTIME
A similar pattern has emerged regarding overtime pay. Two
potential situations can give rise to a grievance involving
overtime: (1) The opportunity for overtime work is not afforded
an employee in violation of a negotiated agreement, and (2) an
employee is denied overtime for work performed in excess of the
employee's regular work-week or outside regular duty hours in
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violation of the agreement. The Back Pay Act is also controlling
in these situations.
Regarding the first situation, prior to 1974, the Comptroller-
General had uniformly held the Back Pay Act was not applicable
unless the work was actually performed. This was changed by
Ruling No. B-175275:
"In the instant case the employee was deprived of over-
time work in violation of a labor-management agreement —
an act of omission. If the agency had not improperly
assigned the work, the employee v/ould have worked and
received overtime compensation. In view of this and our
holding that an act of omission may form the basis of
an award of back pay, we now hold the employee may be
awarded back pay for the overtime lost under the pro-
visions of the Back Pay Act. "16
4
The Council decided a grievant was entitled to overtime in the
second situation in Mare Island Naval Shipyard , although the
grievant must still meet the "but for" test. 165
However, in Immigration and Naturalization Service, Burlington,
Vt
.
, an arbitrator awarded overtime to employees who were denied
overtime in contravention of the collective bargaining agreement.
The agency sought Council review and the Council held:
"Such an award, by ordering the activity to maintain
its past practice, thereby negating the activity's
determination to assign (non-unit) Inspectors to the
inspections during Ctheir) regular tour of duty, con-
travenes the right reserved to management by Section
12(b)(5) of the Order." 166
An agency can argue that any award which allows for the payment
of overtime for denial of the opportunity to perform the work in
effect would force the agency to assign the overtime initially
to the grievant. This negates the agency's opportunity to select
someone else to perform the work. It would appear, therefore,
the award of overtime for opportunity denied is no longer available,
If the employee has actually performed the work, the award is
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still available. In U.S.H.C. Supply Center , Albany, Geor gia,
the employees were detained at the gate after working hours by




1. TRAVEL PAY AND ALLOWANCES
The Council has reviewed arbitration awards in situations
involving employee benefits other than promotions and/or over-
time pay. In FAA, Eastern Region
, the agreement provided: "An
Employee permitted to travel by privately owned vehicle will be
paid mileage at the rate authorized. . . " Agency policy was that
requests to travel by private vehicle must be decided by the
agency within 15 days after the request was submitted. The
grievant applied and his request was not acted upon within the
allotted time, although an agency official indicated his request
would be approved. He departed via private vehicle, but the agency
subsequently disapproved his request. The arbitrator held the
agency violated the collective bargaining agreement and ordered
the grievant reimbursed. The agency sought review of the award
and the Federal Labor Relations Council requested an opinion from
the Comptroller-General. The Comptroller-General held the award
violated Federal Travel Regulations. First, assuming the agency's
policy was that if the applicant had not been notified within 15
days his request was disapproved he was entitled to travel by
private vehicle, this policy "...would circumscribe the agency's
responsibility to make certain determinations required by the
Federal Travel Regulations." Second, "...the fact an agency
official indicated to (the grievant) that his request would be
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approved does not bind the Goverhment as that official was with-
out authority to approve the request. Utah Power and Light v.
U.S. , 243 U.S. 389 (1917) " 168
In three other cases, however, arbitrator's awards for travel-
related expenses were upheld. An Air Traffic Controller stationed
in Anchorage, Alaska, was sent to school in Oklahoma City. Upon
completion of his training course, he was to be reassigned to a
"remote area" of Alaska. Since he was to be transferred from
Anchorage, he was allowed to store personal belongings at govern-
ment expense. While at school, however, a new job opened in
Anchorage which he applied for. His application was accepted,
only now the Agency refused to reimburse him for storage expenses.
The employee filed a grievance which was upheld by the Council
169(after seeking a ruling from the Comptroller-General) . In
IRS, Chicago , the grievants sought per diem commensurate with
assignment to temporary posts of duty outside thier normal com-
muting areas. The Council referred the matter to the Comptroller-
General who resubmitted the case to the arbitrator:
"Specifically, the resubmission is for the purpose
of having the arbitrator clarify and interpret his
award as to his finding therein with regard to the
extent of the Chicago commuting area under the cri-
teria contained in the applicable agency regulation
and as to whether the grievants lived within or with-
out that commuting area."
Finally, in FAA, Alaska Region (#2) , the agency informed an
employee he was entitled to leave between duty stations . Upon
his reporting to his new station (Anchorage) , the agency deter-
mined such a grant was in error and deducted 18 hours of pay and
withheld 10 4 hours of leave. The employee grieved and the arbi-
trator ruled he was entitled to repayment of the deducted salary
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and restored the leave credit. The agency appealed. Once again
the Council sought a ruling from the Comptroller-General, who
field even though there was no authority to grant the employee
the leave, the Waiver Statute 171 would allow him to recover in
this situation.
"Generally, the criteria (of the statute) will be met
by a finding that the erroneous payment of pay or
allowances occurred through administrative error and
there is no indication of fraud, misrepresentation,
fault, or lack of good faith on the part of the em-
ployee."172
2 . TEMPORARY PROMOTIONS
An agency will often assign an employee to perform the duties
of a higher, and better paying, grade. On January 9, 1975, the
Federal Aviation Administration, Standiford Air Traffic Control
Tower, Louisville, Ky. , filled a GS-13 position with three GS-12
employees, each employee occupying the position for 45 days. The
employees argued they were entitled to the higher rate of pay for
the 45 day period, filed a grievance, and the arbitrator agreed
with the employees. The agency sought Council review. The Council,
in turn, requested an interpretation from the Civil Service Com-
mission. The case turns on an interpretation of Chapter 300 of
the Federal Personnel Manual:
"Since extended details also conflict with the prin-
ciples of job evaluation, details will be confined to
a maximum period of 120 days unless prior approval of
the Civil Service Commission is obtained. . .
"
The collective bargaining agreement incorporated Civil Service
Regulations: "Article 23 — Section 1 . Details shall be governed
by Civil Service Commission regulations..." The arbitrator decided
the 135 days involved in this situation exceeded the 120 day maxi-
mum imposed by the Civil Service Commission (the agency had not
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sought approval for an extension) . The Commission ruled the 120
lay maximum applies to the temporary assignment of an individual
employee to a position and not to the filling of a particular
position by more than one employee. Therefore, the award was
set aside.
In Turner-Caldwel l, the Comptroller-General ruled :.. .employees
detailed to higher grade positions for more than 120 days without
prior Civil Service Commission approval, are entitled to retro-
active promotions with back pay for the period beginning with
the 121st day of the detail." 174
3. INCENTIVE AWARDS
"The Employer agrees that quality step increases,
special achievement awards, or other awards based
entirely on job performance, shall be used exclu-
sively for rewarding employees for their performance
of assigned duties. This program shall not be used
to discriminate among employees or to affect favori-
tism. "
The grievant in this case argued he had been discriminated against
when a supervisor had recommended him for an incentive award
which had not been forthcoming (the supervisor retired between
the recommendation and the filing of the grievance and the
grievant's new supervisor had not resubmitted.). The arbitrator
ruled he should receive the award. In construing the Incentive
Awards Action request of the Council, the Comptroller-General
ruled:
"FAA Order 3450. 7B (the agency order implementing the
Act) specifically provides that, although an employee's
immediate supervisor is responsible for initiating a
special achievement award recommendation, there must
be at least two levels of supervision involved in the
initiation and approval process .. .Thus a supervisor's
recommendation does not necessarily mean that an award





Based on this interpretation, the Council modified the award to
require the grievant be recommended by his current supervisor
175for the award.
4. POSITION CLASSIFICATIONS
An agency may assign duties extraneous to a "position de-
scription" provision in the collective bargaining agreement.
"It is agreed that the primary function for an air
traffic controller consists of duties directly re-
lated to air traffic control."
The grievant in this case was also assigned weather observation
and reporting duties. The arbitrator held the extra duties were
beyond the scope of the article in the agreement and the parties
were to "...meet for the purpose of reaching agreement on the
issue and to establish fair and equitable compensation for the
extra work involved." The Civil Service Commission, upon request
of the Council, held:
"An employee who disputes the classification of his
position is entitled to request a determination of
that issue by the Civil Service Commission under the
statutory procedure for classification appeals . 5
U.S. C. Sec. 5512; 5C.F.R. 511.603." 176
5. MISCELLANEOUS AWARDS
An arbitrator's award in favor of a labor organization against
177
the agency will be denied on grounds similar to sovereign immunity.
An arbitrator's award that enforces a provision of the agreement
giving preferential treatment to women and minorities (the agree-
ment required the agency to hire women or -minority applicants in
preference to other equally well-qualified applicants until a
certain percentage of jobs in each grade category was filled)
was overturned by the Council on the ground it contravened Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act.178 An arbitrator's award that re-
assigned a grievant to his original shift, after he had been

assigned to another shift, in violation of the provision in the
agreement that senior employees were to be given preference in
the selection of shifts, was held by the Council to be in viola-
tion of Section 12(b)(5). 179
C. EFFECT OF ARBITRATION AWARDS ON THE SCOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS
The glaring inconsistency is while the agency has clearly
violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, the
grievant is oftentimes denied relif . This may even occur when
the article which is the subject of the grievance has previously
been held negotiable by the Council. The Council is certainly
aware of this possibility, but so far has taken the approach that
negotiability issues and arbitration awards are two separate areas
and will be decided independently. "...The possibility of diverse
interpretations of the merit promotion plan by arbitrators is
18 •
clearly not dispositive." (regarding the question of negoti-
ability.) This position may increase the scope of negotiations;
but will not provide any relief for the bona fide grievant not
*
already available under statute and Civil Service Regulations. The
situations in which the Council has denied an arbitrator's award,
assuming the award conformed to the agreement, might just as well
have resulted in a finding of non-negotiability regarding the
article of the agreement relied on by the grievant and the
arbitrator.
To pursue this farther, I would argue the Council's review
of arbitration awards has further limited the scope of negotia-
tions as follows
:
(1) Areas of consideration for promotions
(2) Special consideration for promotion
(3) Union discrimination
(4) Overtime not actually performed
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(5) Travel Pay and Allowances (as detailed in FAA,
Eastern Region
(6) Temporary Promotions
cursory examination of Appendix A will show this further limit-
ng leaves very little of substance includable in the collective
argaining agreement.
However, I have to believe labor organizations representing
ederal employees are aware of the limits of an arbitrator's
ower as detailed above. The fact the preponderance of collec-
tive bargaining agreements contain an arbitration clause must
tean Federal employees would rather submit discretionary agency
clicy decisions affecting employee rights and benefits to third
arty adjudication than to the head of the agency. In addition,
he system does not prevent the head of the agency from overturning
n arbitrator's decision against a grievant, providing the matter,
n fact, falls within the parameters of agency discretion. The
mployee has a potential two bites at the apple. The critical
ssue thus becomes under what circumstances has the head of an
gency been delegated, by statute or regulation, discretion to
ecide an employee rights and benefits question.
"We believe that once an agreement with a labor organ-
ization is approved under Section 15 of Executive Order
No. 11,491, and the provisions of the agreement are
consistent with laws and regulations and within the
guidelines of Sections 11, 12, and 13 of the Executive
Order, then, unless specifically provided in the agree-
ment, such provisions become non-discretionary agency
policies. Further, we believe that when an agency,
in its discretion, chooses to agree to binding arbi-
tration, then a decision of an arbitrator, if other-
wise proper, becomes, in effect, the decision of the
head of the agency involved." ^°^
'ollowing the reasoning of this case, an argument can be made
:he agency head has the discretion to implement the award should
le choose to exercise it. Whether or not the pattern of seeking
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!ouncil review will continue depends on the posture of the agency,
ly experience has been if reviev; is available, it will be sought.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Courts have entertained actions seeking review in both nego-
;iability decisions 182 and arbitration awards 183 The basis for
illowing review appears to be Section 70 2 of the Administrative
18 4
'rocedure Act:
"We have found no statutory authority which would
preclude review by the Federal Courts of a final
determination by the Federal Labor Relations Council.
There is a basic presumption of judicial review with-
in the meaning of 5 U.S.C. Sec. 702 so long as no
statute precludes relief or the action is not one
committed by law to agency discretion.' 1"
'he Court will inquire whether the Council abused its discretion:
"...the question is whether the decision (of the
Council) was 'made without a rational explanation,
inexplicably departed from established policies or
rested... on other considerations that Congress could
not have intended to make relevant. * Littell v.
Morton, 445 F. 2d 207 (4th Cir. 1971). " 186
'he Federal Courts will not entertain actions unless all remedies
* 18 7irovided for by the Order are exhausted.
The few number of cases decided, plus the application of the
ixhaustion doctrine, leave the Council the ultimate decider for at
.east the time being. I think it is fair to say the system the
!ouncil has developed is a far cry from the traditional collective
largaining in America. And the obstacle responsible is the limits
:he Order — and the Council, the Civil Service Commission, the
!omptroller-General, etc,— places on the scope of negotiations.
:f the Federal employee is destined to truly secure the advantages
'f collective bargaining, the initial reform should be directed
18 8




I believe I have demonstrated that limitations on the scope
of negotiations imposed by Executive Order 11,491 have caused
the current system to evolve into something quite removed from
collective bargaining.
I
89 If one is willing to accept this
state of Federal labor-management relations , the inquiry could
end. Most commentators, some legislators, and the President
of the United States believe the inquiry should continue. 190
I agree.'
There are two alternatives to the present system: 1)
establish some forum other than Congress for fixing terms and
conditions of employment for Federal Employees, or 2) allow
Federal employees to participate in determining such terms and
conditions. The first alternative would clearly violate the
Constitution; and the second is collective bargaining. 191 Since
collective bargaining appears to be the only alternative, the
inquiry thus becomes how far should the scope of bargaining
be expanded. 1 "2
An obvious starting point for this inquiry would be a
study of proposed legislation introduced in Congress dealing
with Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Service. A
great deal of such legislation has been proposed. It has
ranged from including all public sector employees (federal,
state and local) within the coverage of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, 193 to simply incorporating the
provisions of Executive Order 11,491 into law. 194
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A. Current Proposed Legislation
Two bills, both entitled "The Federal Service Labor Ma lage-
ment Act of 1977/' were introduced in the 95th Congress. 195
This proposed legislation tends to follow the pattern of Ex-
ecutive Order 11,491 in all respects save those relating to
the scope of negotiations. However, instead of tasking the
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations
with deciding unit questions, supervising elections, deciding
grievances and deciding unfair labor practice complaints , the
bills establish the Office of General Counsel of the Federal
Labor Relations Authority (the Authority performs virtually




The outstanding features of H.R. 13 concerning the scope
of negotiations are (1) there is no reserved management rights
clause, and (2) conditions of employment are detailed in the bill.
"Section 7103(a) (13) — Conditions of employment
means personnel policies, practices, and matters
affecting working conditions, including, but not
limited to —
(A) pay practices;
(B) work hours and schedules;
(C) overtime practices;
(D) safety;
(E) promotion procedures and assignment, transfer,
detail, leave and reduction-in-force practices;
(F) seniority;
(G) procedures for taking disciplinary actions;
(H) grievance and appeal procedures; and
(I) all matters subject to negotiations in any agency
on, or prior to, the effective date of this Act—
"
iy/
In addition, the bill severely limits an agency's authority to
promulgate regulations affecting terms and conditions of employ-
ment. Under this system, any proposed regulation relating to
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employees of more than one agency is transmitted to a Federal
Personnel Policy Board. The Board is composed of seven members
from among management officials
, seven members from labor organi-
zations and a Chairman. The Board considers each regulation so
transmitted and "submits its conclusions and recommendations to
the issuing agency which shall consider such conclusions and
recommendations before issuing the policy .... involved in the
proposal." Any proposal applicable only to employees of the
issuing agency "shall be subject to negotiation."-^ 8 Arbitra-
tions awards may still be reversed if contrary to law or regula-
tion but back pay is expressly authorized as a remedy. 9 ^ The
bill also ammends the Back-Pay Act to include grievance decisions
as actions falling with the coverage of the Act. ° The bill
does not provide for resolution of negotiability issues separate
-
from refusal to bargain procedures. However , it does provide
for judicial review of decisions by the Federal Labor Relations
Authority, which would include refusal to bargain determina-
tions. 201
H.R. 9 094 makes only one major departure from H.R. 13. It
incorporates a system for the establishment of pay, benefits,
and classification of Federal employees. Briefly, the bill
allows the President, through his Agent (composed of the Chair-
man, Civil Service Commission; the Secretary of Labor; and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget) to submit recom-
mendations regarding pay, benefits and classification to the
Federal Employees Pay and Benefits Committee (composed of seven
members selected from labor organizations.). The Agent and the
54

Committee, with the assistance of the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, if necessary, attempt to agree on appro-
priate adjustments. If the parties cannot agree, the matter is
submitted to the Arbitration Board on Federal Employees Pay
and Benefits (composed of seven members — three appointed by
the President, three by the Federal Employees Pay and Benefits
Committee, andthe seventh, the Chairman, to be selected by the
other six) . Should the President agree with the Committee or
the Board, that recommendation for adjustment will be submitted
to Congress by 1 September, and becomes effective unless Congress
rejects the recommendation. Should the President disagree, both
plans — i.e., the President's and the Arbitration Board's —
will be submitted to Congress. The President's plan becomes
202
effective unless Congress adopts an alternate.
The bill also adds four items to the list of conditions of
employment while also listing three exclusions:
"Section 7103(a) (16) — 'co'nditions of employment' means
personnel policies, practices and matters affecting
working conditions , including —
(A) Pay practices;
(B) work hours and schedules;
(C) overtime practices;
(D) safety;
(E) promotion procedures and assignment, transfer,
detail, leave and reduction-in-force practices;
(F) seniority;
(G) procedures for disciplinary actions;
(H) grievance and appeal procedures;
(I) contracting out;
(J) use of military personnel;
(K) training; and
(L) travel and per diem;
but does not include policies, practices, and matters
relating to —
(i) discrimination in employment because of race,
color, religion, sex, age or national origin;
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(ii) political activities prohibited under sub-
chapter III of chapter 7 3 of this title; or
(iii) provisions of Federal law which affect working
conditions, which apply to both public and private
employees, and which are not negotiable under
collective bargaining agreements with private
employers." 20 ^
H.R. 9094 does away with the Federal Personnel Policy Board
approach to the promulgation of agency regulations. It would
appear the drafters felt the language: "...The agency may not
make or apply rules or regulations which restrict the scope of
collective bargaining permitted by this Chapter..." coupled
with the fact it is an unfair labor practice "...to fail or
refuse to comply with any provision of this chapter." 205 placed
enough limitations on the agency's ability to make unilateral
changes by means of agency regulations.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Assuming, for political reasons, the National Labor Relations
Act will not be amended to include Federal employees , the approach
taken by H.R. 9094 in delineating subjects of collective bargain-
ing appears to be the most advantageous method for affecting
change. The politicians must decide what terms and conditions
of employment they wish to retain control over and what terms
and conditions they wish to submit to participation by Federal
employees in their determination.
Professor Summers has written an article that attempts to
answer this question with the emphasis on political forces at
work in the process of arriving at terms and conditions of
20 6
employment for public employees. Briefly, he balances
demands of employees against the effect the granting of such
56

demands will have on budgetary decision making. The greater
the impact of the demand on expenditures of taxpayers 1 monies,
the less likely the political forces at work will accede to
collective bargaining as a means of determining that particular
term or condition of employment. The less impact, the greater
the possibility. For example, an increase in wages has an
immediate and drastic effect on any budget and thus most poli-
ticians would rather not submit this subject to collective
bargaining. On the other hand, personnel policies and practices
have little or no impact on the budget and thus should be sub-
jects of collective bargaining. He delineates terms and con-
ditions of employment for public employees into seven basic
categories: (1) wage increases, (2) indirect wage payments
(such as insurance, etc...), (3) deferred wage costs (pension
plans), (4) reduction in level or service (leave, holidays,
etc...), (5) increase in level of services, (6) determination
of goals and methods, and (7) personnel practices and administra-
*
207tion. The first two categories impact directly on current
budget constraints and thus political forces would mitigate
strongly against their being included within the scope of
negotiations. Deferred wages costs impact on future budgets
and thus provide an ideal trade-off to potential employee
demands for direct and indirect wage increases. Further down
the scale, manipulations of the level of service provided by
public employees and determination of goals and methods will
have even less impact on current expenditures. Finally, as to
personnel policies and administration, Professor Summers believes
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"Resistance to union demands comes primarily from the
government itself. Agency and department heads will
resist encroachments on their management authority in
the name of better and more efficient service to the
public." 208
The effect on expenditures will be negligible.
If Professor Summers' categorizations are appropriate,
and I believe they are, there should be little or no political
resistance to establishing a collective bargaining system
whereby the scope of negotiations would include all categories
except direct and indirect wage increases. 209
History does not bear out this hypothesis. Proposed legis-
lation and review by the Executive Branch have constantly played
with fine tuning the scope of bargaining with no appreciable
21success on the expansion end of the scale. This situation,
aside from the usual bureaucratic and legislative inertia, is
the result of the tremendous influence the merit system plays
in Federal employment. The politicians are convinced the most
visible, and thus the most p'otentially damaging politically,
facet of government service is the caliber of performance of
federal employees as viewed by the taxpayer, whether services
rendered or corruption perceived. To avoid public outcry over
poor service and/or corruption, the politicians are unwilling to
allow federal employees any control over their own destinies.
Until this phobia is dispelled, there is little hope for change.
The best example of the political realities of this fear is
the profound changes in the Civil Service system that have taken




"The Pendleton Act created the Commission and charged
it with the very limited responsibility of establishing
a system for 'open, competitive examinations for test-
ing the fitness of applicants for the public service'
and for fulfilling vacancies 'from among those grades
highest.
'
The Act specifically prohibited political
influence as a basis for selecting federal employees
and, instead, required federal managers to rely on more
objective methods to distinguish the relative abilities
of candidates in conducting their selection processes.
Hence, merit was defined as the absence of political
influence in the selection of employees for federal
service.
Despite this limited objective, the concept of
merit now has been expanded to include all aspects
of an individual's work environment and has become
a talisman for resisting change." 211
I would submit instead of the merit system being a talisman for
resisting change, it has succeeded in becoming a talisman for
*
removing federal employees from participation in determining
212the terms and conditions of their employment. Change has
certainly taken place, change toward all pervasive political
control. In this way the politican can so limit employee
prerogatives that any conduct deviating from the almost biblical
concept of merit Congress believes the public expects from its
servants is the result of employee aberration and not through
any fault on the part of the politicans.
There are two obvious retorts to this perception: (1) Ini-
tiative is stifled, resulting in automoton performance, and
(2) greater efficiency will result if the employee is allowed
to participate in the process of formulating the terms and
conditions of his or her employment. Yet these old saws have
been trotted out time and time again to no avail.
Fortunately, the fairly recent reorganization of the Postal
Service can serve as a model for the decision raker in deciding
t^a

how increased employee participation affects the public's image
of the Federal employee. A perusal of current periodicals
would leave even the most optimistic reformer skeptical of the
efficacy of the change, for they routinely condemn the change.214
From this standpoint, there appears to be little hope for in-
creasing employee participation in the Federal service as a
whole.
This would be the end of the discussion, absent a meteoric
improvement in Postal services, were it not for the age-old
handmaiden of labor-management relations — power. While the
Congress may want the public to believe the Postal Reorganization
Act of 1970 was wholly a response to the inefficiencies of the
system, even the most biased perusal of the legislative history
of the Act leads to the conclusion the postal strike of March,
1969, played a very important part. 2l -> In truth, the agreement
between the administration and the representatives of postal
unions which terminated the work stoppage became in effect,
Public Law 91-37 5. The no-strike law notwithstanding,
the traditional labor weapon succeeded where all other efforts
had failed. The question could thus be asked of the Congress:
Do public employees have to resort to a strike to accomplish
their stated desire to participate in determining the terms and
conditions of their employment?
C. CONCLUSION
Congress is impaled on the horns of a dilemma. Lessening
control over terms and conditions of employment will bring the
individual politician closer to receiving blame for the inade-
quacies of the Federal bureaucracy. Maintaining control could
60

well be catastrophic. The only alternative appears to be a
compromise somewhere between total control by Congress and a
scope of bargaining based on the private model. For sure, some
change in the current status of arbitrations awards would be
relatively painless from a political standpoint and would do
away with what I consider to be the greatest inequity of the
present system. An amendment to the Back Pay Act similar to
that propounded by H.R. 90 9 4 would accomplish this purpose.
Further than that, much soul searching will be necessary. I
do not mean to sound like a prophet of doom; but I have worked
in the Federal service for fourteen years and until Federal
employees succeed in gaining greater participation in determin-
ing the terms and conditions of their employment, I am afraid
the specter of March, 1969, remains. On the other hand, until
the Federal employee, primarily through his elected labor repre-
sentative, can convince the public (and the Congress) collective
bargaining will provide better service at no increase in cost,
the present inertia will remain. Were I affiliated with a labor
organization representing Federal employees, I would direct all
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UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20415
YO'JR REFERENCE
JAN 3 1 1978
LCDR, J.N. Baker, JAGC, USN
400 Perkins, No. 501
Oakland, California 94610
Dear Commander Baker:
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter requesting various
labor relations agreements in the Federal Service.
I am enclosing a copy of the listing of agreements that you
forwarded. The two check marks indicate that we do not have
these particular agreements on file.
The charge for sending you this information would be a fee of
$30.00 for the staff time involved in assembling the information
plus an additional charge of 10c per page for reproducing the
agreements. There are roughly thirty to sixty pages per agree-
ment.
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3 C.F.R. 361 (1966-1970 Compilation). The Order has been
amended by Exec. Order No. 11,616, 3 C.F-.R. 605 (1971-1975
Compilation), Exec. Order No. 11,636, 3 C.F.R. 634 (1971-1975
Compilation), Exec. Order No. 11,838, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1971-1975
Compilation) and Exec. Order No. 11,901, 41 Fed. Reg. 4807
(1976). The current text may be found in 1976 2 Lab. Rel.
Exp. (BNA 4431.) (Hereinafter cited as Order )
Id , Preamble.
Id , Section 2(a). "Agency" means an executive department,
a Government corporation, an independent establishment as
defined in Section 104 of Title 5, U. S. Code, except the
General Accounting Office." "The Order does not apply to
(1) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (2) the Central
Intelligence Agency; (3) any other agency or bureau, or
entity within an agency, which has as a primary function
intelligence, investigative, or security work, when the
head of an agency determines, in his sole judgment, that
the Order cannot be applied in a manner consistent with
national security requirements and considerations; or
(4) any office, bureau or entity within an agency which has
as a primary function investigation or audit of the conduct
or work of officials or employees of the agency for the
purpose of ensuring honesty and integrity in the discharge
of their official duties, when the head of the agency
determines, in his sole judgment, that the Order cannot
be applied in a manner consistent with the internal security
of the agency; (5) the Foreign Service of the United States:
Department of State, United States Information Agency and
Agency for International Development and its successor
agency or agencies; (6) the Tennessee Valey Authority."
Id , Section 3 (b)
.
Id , Section 2(e).
" (e) Labor organization means a lawful organization of
any kind in which employees participate and which exists
for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
agencies concerning grievances, personnel policies and
practices, or other matters affecting the working con-
ditions of their employees; but does not include an
organization which —
(1) consists of management officials or supervisors,
except as provided in section 24 of this Order;
(2) assists or participates in a strike against the
Government of the United States or any agency thereof, or
imposes a duty or obligation to conduct, assist, or parti-
cipate in such a strike;
(3) advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form
of government in the United States; or

(4) discriminates with regard to the terms or conditions
of membership because of race, color, creed, sex, age, or
national origin."
Id
, Section 2 (b)
.
" (b) Employee means an employee of an agency and an
.employee of a nonappropriated fund instrumentality of the
United States but does not include, for the purpose of
exclusive recognition or national consultation rights, a
supervisor, except as provided in section 24 of this order."
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not contained in F .L.R.C. are cited as United States Federal
Labor Relations Council, Report of Case Decisions (hereinafter
cited as Report No. ) .
19* See generally Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees (A.F.G.E.)
Local 19 23 and Social Sec. Adm'n Headquarters, Baltimore,
Md., F.L.R.C. No. 71A-22, 1 F.L.R.C. 390, at 396 (May 23, 1973)
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118. Id, at p. 17
119. F.E.M.T.C. and Naval Supply Center, Charleston, S.C., F.L.R.C.
71A-52, 1 F.L.R.C. 235 (Nov. 24, 1972). See also N.T.E.U. and
U.S. Customs Service, Region VII, F.L.R.C. No. 76A-28, Report
No. 123 (Apr. 7, 1977).
120. Id at 240. See also Local 2219, I.B.E.W. and Corps of Engineers,
Little Rock, Ark., F.L.R.C. No. 71A-46, 1 F.L.R.C.
(Nov. 20, 1973)
.
121. Patent Office Professionals Ass'n and U. S. Patent Office,
F.L.R.C. 75A-13, 3 F.L.R.C. 635 at 641 (Oct. 3, 1975).
122. Tidewater, Va., F.E.M.T.C. and Public Works Center, Norfolk,
Va., F.L.R.C. No. 71A-56, 1 F.L.R.C. 431 (Jun. 29, 1973).

See Pattern Makers, AFL-CIO and Naval Ship and Research Develop-
ment Center, Bethesda, Md., F.L.R.C. No. 73A-28, 1 F.L.R.C. 516
(Aug. 17, 1973); F.E.T.C. and Naval Shipyard, Charleston, S.C.,
F.L.R.C. 72A-46, 1 F.L.R.C. 610, (Dec. 27, 1973); Philadelphia
Metal Trades Council and Philadelphia Naval Shipyard Employees
Cafeteria Association, F.L.R.C. No. 75A-5, 1 F.L.R.C. 509 (Aug. 10,
19 7 3) ; Local 3, American Federation of Technical Engineers and
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, F.L.R.C. No. 71A-48, 1 F.L.R.C. 423
(Jun. 29, 1973); Local 174, American Federation of Technical
Engineers and Superintendent of Shipbuilding, 11th Naval District,
San Diego, Ca. , F.L.R.C. No. 71A-49 , 1 F.L.R.C. 427 (Jun. 29, 1973);
A.F.G.E., Local 1170 and Public Health Service, Seattle Wash.,
F.L.R.C. No. 76A-92, Report No. 130 (Jul. 12, 1977); A.F.G.E.
Local 916 and Tinker AFB, F.L.R.C. 76A-96, Report No. 131 (Jul. 13,
1977); and Graphic Arts Int'l Union and E.R.D.A. Oak Ridge, Tenn.,
F.L.R.C. 76A-65, Report No. 132 (Aug. 2, 1977).
Local 1485, N.F.F.E. and Coast Guard Base, Miami, Fla. , F.L.R.C.
No. 75A-77, Report No. 110 (Aug. 2, 1976)
.
Philadelphia Metal Trades Council and Philadelphia Naval Shipyard,
F.L.R.C. No. 72A-40, 1 F.L.R.C. 456 at 458 (Jun. 29, 1973).
N.A.G.E., Local R12-58 and McClellan AFB, F.L.R.C. No. 75A-90,
Report No. 114 (Oct. 22, 1976).
A.F.G.E. Local 1170 and PHS Hospital, Seattle, Wash., F.L.R.C.
No. 76A-92, Report No. 130 (Jul. 12, 1977).
N.T.E.U. and U. S. Customs Service, Region VII, F.L.R.C. No.
76A-28, Report No. 123 (Apr. 7, 1977).
Order , supra Note 1, Section 11(a)
.
United Fed'n of College Teachers, Local 1460 and U. S. Merchant
Marine Academy, F.L.R.C. No. 71A-15, 1 F.L.R.C. 210 (Nov. 20, 1972),
Air Force Defense Language Institute, Lackland AFB and A.F.G.E.,
Local 1367, F.L.R.C. No. 73A-64, 2 F.L.R.C. 238 (Oct. 25, 1974).
Nat'l Border Patrol Council, Nat ' 1 I.&N.S. Council, A.F.G.E. and
I.&N.S., F.L.R.C. No. 76A-47, Report No. 114 (Sept. 29, 1976).
See infra Notes 139 - 141 and accompanying text detailing the
functions of the Federal Services Impasse Panel.
A.F.G.E. Local 1668 and Elmendorf AFB, F.L.R.C. No. 72A-10
,
1 F.L.R.C. 361 (May 15, 1973). See also I. A.M. and Louisville
Naval Ordnance Station, Ky. , F.L.R.C. No. 73A-21, 2 F.L.R.C. 55
(Jan. 31, 1974).
Philadelphia Metal Trades Council and Philadelphia Naval Shipyard,
F.L.R.C. No. 72A-73, 1 F.L.R.C. 287 (Apr. 3, 1973).
A.F.G.E., Local 2152 and GSA Region 3, F.L.R.C. No. 76A-106 (1977)
719 Gov't Emp. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 5.

N.F.F.E. , Local 476 and Joint Tactical Communications Office,
Ft. Monmouth, N.J., F.L.R.C. No. 72A-42, 1 F.L.R.C. 499 (Aug 8, 1973)
This appears to be a common phenomena in public sector collective
bargaining: "I have heard all too many teachers* union officials,
for example, say, 'when you ask me why these things are in the
contract, was it because I fought to get them? No. ' Their answer
is, 'I was flabbergasted when the employer told me yes. I put
them on a laundry list, just like we did in the private sector,
and lo and behold, the employer came back, or the school board
came back, and they said, 'Sure, we will agree to A, B, X, Y, Z.'"
at 14 4. Statement by Prof. Harry T. Edwards, Harvard Law School.
See Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector , A.S. Knapp, Ed.,
ABA Section of Labor Rel. Law (1977).
This hypothesis can be tested by a review of Collective Bargaining
Agreements entered into pursuant to the Order. Those agreements
available to me at present contain most of the proposals deemed
negotiable by the Council. See generally Collective Bargaining
Agreement Between U. S. Naval Weapons Station, Charleston, Va.,
and A.F.G.E. Local 2298, (1976) 671 Gov't Emp. Rel. Rep. (BNA) X-l.
The Labor Agreement Information Retrieval System of the Civil
Service Commission's Office of Labor-Management Relations is
able to provide copies of all pertinent collective bargaining
agreements. However, the cost involved in procuring copies
through the mail is more than I wish to bear at this time (see
Appendix B--by my calculations, approximately $125.00).
Order , supra Note 1, Section 5.
See 5 C.F.R. 2471.1 - 2471.16 (1977).
The following case illustrates the Panel's ultimate power in
this situation. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad
Administration and Local 2814, A.F.G.E., 76 F.S.I. P. No. 7
(Jan. 19, 1977) (Release #74) . The order of the Federal Services
Impasse Panel reads as follows:
"Pursuant to the authority vested in it by Executive Order 11491
as amended, and in accordance with the findings set forth above,
the Federal Impasse Panel hereby orders the following:
I. The parties shall include the following provisions within
their new agreement at Article XVII:
A grievance is defined to be any dispute between the
Employer and the Union or an employee or employees covered by
this agreement
Matter subject to statutory appeal procedure are not
subject to grievance arbitration.
II. The parties shall include the following within their
new agreement at Article XVIII:

The arbitrator shall have no power to add to, subtract
from, disregard, alter, or modify any of the terms of this agree-
ment or the aforementioned published policies of the Panel."
(1) GSA Region III, Washington, D.C., and Local 2151, A.F.G.E.,
Case No. 73 FSIP 18, Panel Release No. 41 (Jul. 11, 1974). The
Panel directed the parties to "include in their current agreement
a provision to the effect that the temporary assignment for more
than 30 consecutive calendar days of an employee to a higher
grade position which is above the journeyman level shall be
made by temporary promotion." (2) Dept. of Justice, I.&N.S.,
Washington, D.C., and Nat'l Council of I.&N.S. Locals, A.F.G.E.,
Case No. 73 FSIP 14, Panel Release No. 50 (Mar. 19, 1975). The
Panel ordered the parties to include in the agreement (a) specific
language which provides the employees with assurance that, where
investigations are prolonged, the employer will grant a reason-
able extension of the response period to the proposed disciplinary
action, and (b) the parties negotiate a new promotion plan that
would include a procedure for the resolution of grievances.
(3) Pa. Nat'l Guard and Pa. State Council of Ass'n of Civilian
Technicians, Case No. 75 FSIP 7, Panel Release No. 62 (Feb. 27,
19 76) . "The parties shall include in their agreement a provision
to the effect that the union may at any time within 180 days
from the effective date of the agreement notify the employer
of its desire to engage in negotiations on the subjects of
(1) reductions in force, and (2) military uniforms; and the
parties will commence negotiations within a reasonable period
of time after receipt of such notice by the employer." (4) DOT,
Fed. RR Adm'n, Wash., D.C., and Local 2814, A.F.G.E., Case No.
76 FSIP 7, Panel Release No. 74 (Jan. 19, 1977). The union
proposal was ordered included in the agreement en to to . "A
grievance is defined to be any dispute between the Employer and
the Union or an employee or employees covered by this agreement,
which may pertain to any matter involving the interpretation or
application of (1) this agreement, or (2) published agency
policies and regulations which concern (a) personnel policies
and practices, and (b) matters affecting working conditions,
whether or not specifically covered by this agreement. Matters
subject to statutory appeal procedures are not subject to this
grievance procedure." (5) DOT, FAA, Nat'l Aviation Facilities
Experimental Center, Atlantic City, N.J., and Local 2 3 35, A.F.G.E.
Case No. 76 F.S.I. P. 9, Panel Release No. 75 (Jan. 24, 1977).
This case involved the same proposal as cited in Fed. R.R. Adm'n
and the Panel reached the same decision.
3. Dep't. of Labor, Employment Standard Adm'n., Wash. D.C., and
Nat'l Council of Field Labor Lodges, A.F.G.E., Case No. 76 FSIP
49, Panel Release No. 79 (Apr. 27, 1977).
4. NLRB and NLRB Union, Case No. 75 FSIP 41, Panel Release No. 71
(Sep. 14, 1976) at 1.
5. Id at 2.
6. Id at 3.

Order
, supra Note 1, Section 13(b).
See Frazier, Labor Arbitration in the Federal Service, 45 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 712 at 713 (1977).
Order
, supra Note 1, Section 4(c) (3).
5 C.F.R. 2411.37 (a)
.
Meltzer, supra Note 72, Appendix: An Illustrative Collective
Bargaining Agreement, Article VI, Section 1.
5 U.S.C., Section 5596 (1970).
5 CFR 550.804 (a) (1977) .
See generally
, A.F.G.E., Local 2499 and Headquarters, Defense
Supply Agency, F.L.R.C. No. 73A-51, 2 F.L.R.C. 200 (Sep. 24, 1974).
54 Comp. Gen. 312 at 313-314 (1974)
.
Id . The striking feature of this case is the agency did not
appeal the award to the Council but rather, apparently desiring
to implement the award , sought approval from the Comptroller-
General accordingly. There is no question under current Council
decisions (see supra Note 154) the Council would have reversed
the award
.
Army Depot, Toole, Utah and A.F.G.E., Local 2188, F.L.R.C. No.
75-104 (1976) 675 Gov't Emp. Rel. Rep. (BNA) A-3.
NASA, Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Ala. and
Marshall Engineers & Scientists^ Ass'n, Local 127, Int'l Fed'n
of Professional & Technical Engineers, F.L.R.C. No. 76A-130,
Report No. 135 (Aug. 23, 1977) at p. 2.
Id , at p. 3.
54 Comp. Gen. 312 at 319.
Community Serv. Adm'n, CSA Region V and A.F.G.E. Local 2816,
F.L.R.C. No. 75A-120, Report No. 124 (Apr. 7, 1977).
Army & Air Force Exchange Serv., Dallas, Tex., and A.F.G.E.
Local 2921, F.L.R.C. No. 76A-20, Report No. 128 (Jun. 21, 1977).
See also Nat'l Council of OEO Locals, A.F.G.E. and O.E.O., F.L.R.C.
No. 73A-67, (1975) 592 Gov't Emp. Rel. Rep. (BNA) A-5.
A.F.G.E., Local 1760 and Social Security Adm'n, N.E. Program
Center, F.L.R.C. 77A-31, Report No. 136 (Aug. 26, 1977).
54 Comp. Gen. 1071 at 1074 (1974)
.
Mare Is. Naval Shipyard and Mare Island Metal Trades Council,
F.L.R.C. No. 74A-64 (1976) 657 Gov't Emp. Rel. Rep. (BNA) A-17
.

6. I.&N.S., Burlington, Vt., and A.F.G.E. Local 2538, F.L.R.C. No.
76A-131, Report No. 131 (Jul. 13, 1977).
7. U.S.M.C. Supply Center, Albany, Ga. and A.F.G.E., F.L.R.C. No.
75A-98, Report No. 122 (Mar. 8, 1977).
8. PATCO and FAA, Eastern Region, F.L.R.C. No. 76A-10, Report No.
121 (Jan. 18, 1977).
9. PATCO and FAA, Alaska Region, F.L.R.C. No. 76A-98, Report No.
124 (Apr. 12, 1977).
0. IRS, Chicago District Office and N.T.E.U., F.L.R.C. 76A-150,
Report No. 128 (uUn. 7, 1977)
.
1. 5 U.S.C. Section 5584 (1970).
2. PATCO and FAA, Alaska Region, F.L.R.C. No. 76A-99, Report No.
133 (Aug. 17, 1977)
.
3. FAA, Standiford Tower, Louisville, Ky. and PATCO, F.L.R.C. No.
76A-6, Report No. 128 (Jun. 7, 1977).
4. 55 Comp. Gen. 539 (1975). In I. A.M. and Naval Air Rework Facility,
Norfolk, Va., F.L.R.C. 77A-11, Report No. 140 (Dec. 20, 1977),
the grievant was detailed to fill a vacant supervisory position.
The collective bargaining agreement provided that any employee
so detailed in excess of ten (10) days was entitled to temporary
promotion. The grievant remained "detailed" for 120 days and
applied for Back-Pay. The arbitrator's award was reversed by
the Council on the ground the grievant was not qualified for the
position in question and thus was not entitled to the temporary
promotion and back-pay. This case could signal continued vitality
for articles in agreements requiring temporary promotions of less
I
than 120 days since the Council could have just as easily cited
FAA Louisville in reversing the award.
5. FAA, Montgomery Rapcon Tower, Ala., and PATCO, F.L.R.C. No.
75A-B2, Report No. 119 (Dec. 20, 1976).
6. FAA and PATCO, F.L.R.C. 76A-113, Report No. 129 (Jun. 30, 1977).
See U.S. v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976) holding a person so
aggrieved is entitled to a statutory appeals procedure pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. Section 5512 (1970) and 5 CFR 511.603.
7. I. A.M. Lodge 2424 v. United States, No. 172-76 (Ct. CI. decided
Oct. 19, 1977). The emphasis in this decision is a labor
organization is attempting to collect dues the government had
terminated the check-off on. Since no statute gives a labor
union the right to recover such monies (contrasted with the
Back Pay Act's application to individual employees), the
arbitrator's award was reversed.
. OEO and A.F.G.E., Local 267, F.L.R.C. No. 75A-23 (1976) 655
Gov't Erap. Rel. Rep. (BNA) C-2.

179. VA. Hospital, Canandaiqua, N.Y. and Serv. Employees Int'l Union,
F.L.R.C. No. 72A-42, 2F.L.R.C. 164 (Jul. 31, 1974).
180. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, Local 234 and ERDA Oak Ridge, Tenn.,
F.L.R.C. 76A-65, Report No. 132 (Aug. 2, 1977).
181. 54 Comp. Gen. 312 at 316 (1974) . See United States General
Accounting Office Manual on Remedies Available to Third
Parties in Adjudicating Federal Employee Grievances (Mar. 30,
1977) for the Comptroller-General's views on the powers of
an arbitrator under the Order.
182. National Broiler Council v. Federal Labor Relations Council,
382 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Va. 1974).
183. I. A.M. Lodge 2424 v. United States, No. 172-76 (Ct. CI. decided
Oct. 19, 1977).
184. 5 U.S.C. Section 702 (1970).
185. Mont. Chapter of Ass'n of Civilian Technicians v. Young, 519
F. 2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1975).
186. Nat'l Broiler Council v. Fed. Labor Relations Council, 382 F.
Supp. 322 at 325 (E.D. Va.' 1974).
187. See Montana Chapter of Association of Civilian Technicians v.
Young, supra Note 99 (The plaintiffs desired to negotiate the
uniform issue described supra notes 58-49 and accompanying
text. However they chose to appeal the agency determination
of non-negotiability directly to the Courts instead of to the
Council. The Court held they must exhaust the remedies pro-
vided for by the Order.) See also Weitzel v. Portney, 548 F.
2d 489 (4th Cir. 1977) . (In a suit to redress his failure to
be promoted the plaintiff alleged, inter alia , the agency
violated the collective bargaining agreement. The Court held
he must pursue the grievance procedures established by the
agreement and any routes of appeal provided by the Order before
seeking relief in a Federal Court.) See also Rowe v. Tennessee,
431 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Tenn. 1977). (The plaintiff contended
the defendants — members of the Tennessee National Guard —
interfered with his right to join a union. "There is no indi-
cation the plaintiff exhausted any available remedies against
these defendants for their alleged interference. Interference
with an employee's efforts to join a union constitutes an un-
fair labor practice under Section 19 of Executive Order 11,491.
His remedy, therefore, would be to file an unfair labor practice
charge with the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management
Relations." Id at 1265.)
188. Some commentators advocate the abolishment of all limitations--
i.e., placing Federal employees within the coverage of the
National Labor Relations Act. See Tobias, The Scope of
Bargaining in the Federal Sector: Collectiv e Bargaining
or Collective Consultation , 4 4 Geo. Wash. L. ?,ev. 554 (19 76) .
(Hereinafter cited as Tobias .)

See Notes 137 - 138 supra .
See Tobias, Note 188 supra ; Summers, Public Employee Bargain-
ing: A Political Perspective , 83 Yale L. J. 1156 (1974) (here-
inafter cited as Summers) ; Kagel, Grievance Arbitration in
the Federal Service: How Final and Binding? 51 Ore. L. Rev.
134 (1971) ; Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the
Public Sector
, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 885 (1973); 1977 B.Y.U.
L. Rev. 429 (1977); See Notes 193 - 209 infra for proposed
legislation; The New York Times, March 2, 1978. p. A10 stated
President Carter would "...propose creation of a Federal
labor relations authority that would conduct union elections,
define unfair labor practices and generally perform the
tasks the National Labor Relations Board does in private
industry.
"
U. S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 1.
Prof. Summers describes collective bargaining as: "...the
process of establishing terms and conditions of employment
in a written agreement negotiated between the public employer
and a union acting as exclusive representative of the em-
ployees in the unit. See Summers, Note 190 supra at 1156.
See H.R. 13, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
See H.R. 4800, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
H.R. 13, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (hereinafter cited
as H.R. 13) and H.R. 9094, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)
(hereinafter cited as H.R. 9094).
Id , Sec. 2, Subsec. 7104.
H.R. 13, Note 193 supra , Sec. 2, Subsec. 7103 (a) (13)
.
Id, Sec. 2, Subsec. 7113(c).
Id , Sec. 2, Subsec. 7121.
Id, Sec. 3, amendment to 5 U.S.C. Sec. 5596(b).
Id, Sec. 2, Subsec. 7122.
H.R. 9094, Note 195 supra , Sec. 2, Subsecs. 7114 - 7115.
This system is similar to the Pay Comparability Act, 5
U.S.C. Sees. 5301-08.
203. Id, Sec. 2, Subsec. 7103 (a) (16).
204. Id, Sec. 2, Subsec. 7103(a) (17).
205. Id, Sec. 2, Subsec. 7117(a)(7).

06. Summers, Note supra .
37. Id, at 1177 - 1183.
D8. Id. , at 1183.
D9. Congressman Clay must have read Prof. Summers' article,
as H.R. 9094 does just that.
LO. See Note 137 supra ; U. S. Federal Labor Relations Council.
Labor Management Relations in the Federal Service , 1975)
.
LI. Tobias, Note 188 supra at 560. See also Hearings on H.R. 13,
HR. 9784, H.R. 10700 and Related Bills before the Subcommittee
on Manpower and Civil Service of the House Comm. on Post
Office and Civil Service, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (Ser.
93-51)
.
L2. As a commentator stated in 188 4: "Open competition presents
at once the most just and practicable means of supplying
fit persons for appointment. It is proved to have given the
best public servants; it makes an end to patronage; and,
besides being based on equal rights and common justice, it
has been found to be the surest safeguard against partisan
coercion and official favoritism." W. D. Foulke, The Theory
and Practice of Civil Service Reform (Wash: NCSRL, 1884) at 11,
L3. Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-375, 84 Stat.
719 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 3, 5, 12, 15, 18,
31, 39, and 40, U.S.C.
L4. See generally Newsweek, March 22, 19 76 at 61; Newsweek
Apr. 9, 19 7 3 at 97; U. S. News and World Rep., Sep. 13,
1976 at 63; U. S. News and World Rep., Mar. 22, 1976 at
26; U. S. News and World Rep., Mar. 15, 1976 at 19; U. S.
News and World Rep., Jul. 14, 1975 at 9; U. S. News and
World Rep., Jul. 1, 1974 at 5; Time, Mar. 15, 1976 at 71;
Time, Jul. 7, 1975 at 13; 55 Cong. Dig. 260 (1976); Nation's
Business, Mar. 12, 19 76 at 11; New Republic, Apr. 10, 19 76
at 7; Commonweal, Jan. 18, 19 76 at 357; Commonweal, Oct.
24, 1975 at 485; Nation, Mar. 22, 1975 at 325; Nat'l Rep.,
Dec. 21, 1973 at 1426.
.5. See H. R. Rep. No. 1104, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., S. Rep. 912,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1970) U. S. Code Cong,
and Ad. News 3649.
.6. Id at 3651-3652.
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